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North Carolina's system of rotation of superior court judges, the
efficient supervision of trials requires that judges exercise the
traditional, inherent power to reconsider and modify, if necessary,
such in fieri orders. The authors trace the law of reconsideration
of interlocutory orders back to the adoption of the North Carolina
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rotation under the 1875 amendments to the North Carolina
Constitution. The authors argue that, for more than a century, the
only orders precluded from reconsideration at the trial level were
those of predecessor judge that were immediately reviewable under
the appeals provision of the Code. The North Carolina Supreme
Court's rationale in the 1972 case Calloway v. Ford Motor Co.,
however, has led the court of appeals to forbid the reconsideration
of interlocutory orders and to allow renewed motions only of
matters addressed to the discretion of the trial court on changed
circumstances. The authors recommend that the supreme court
disavow its rationale in Calloway and return to a traditional rule
that is more workable than the strict jurisdictional prohibition now
observed in North Carolina.
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"The principle that no appeal lies from one judge of the Superior
Court to another ... has no application to a mere interlocutory
order."'
INTRODUCTION
Most attorneys practicing in North Carolina today are familiar
with the simple rule recurring in recent case law that "[o]ne superior
1. Bland v. Faulkner, 194 N.C. 427, 429, 139 S.E. 835, 836 (1927). This statement
contrasts with the oft-quoted language from Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496,




court judge may not overrule another."2 Many attorneys understand
this rule to mean that a trial judge lacks the power to reconsider and
overrule an interlocutory order entered in the same case by another
trial judge. The reasons for such a rule may seem rather obvious.
The first is judicial economy. Litigation cannot efficiently progress to
a trial and conclusion if intermediate decisions of the trial court are
routinely reopened, reconsidered, and possibly overruled or modified.
Second, such reconsideration would appear to encourage judge
shopping. Third, and perhaps of more concern, permitting one judge
to overrule another judge's decision could damage the relationship
between the two judges. Fourth, routine reversals might also damage
the public's perception that judges' decisions are based on the rule of
law rather than on their individual proclivities. Finally, to allow
reconsideration would appear to permit a judge to review the prior
decision of another judge of coordinate jurisdiction for error. Such
reconsideration would seem to subvert the normal appellate process
whereby error is subject to review and correction in an appeal to a
higher court. It is thus clear that powerful policies militate against the
routine reconsideration of interlocutory orders.
Yet, powerful policies also caution against an absolute
prohibition of reconsideration As litigation progresses,
2. Able Outdoor, Inc. v. Harrelson, 341 N.C. 167, 169, 459 S.E.2d 626, 627 (1995)
(citing Calloway, 281 N.C. at 501, 189 S.E.2d at 488); see also Charns v. Brown, 129 N.C.
App. 635, 638, 502 S.E.2d 7, 9 (1998) ("A superior court judge may not overrule the order
of another superior court judge."); Huffaker v. Holley, 111 N.C. App. 914, 915, 433 S.E.2d
474, 475 (1993) ("North Carolina adheres to the rule that one superior court judge may
not overrule the order of another superior court judge previously made in the same case
on the same issue."); Holloway v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., 109 N.C. App. 403, 413,
428 S.E.2d 453, 458 (1993) ("One superior court judge may not overrule a judgment
previously made by another superior court judge in the same action."); Whittaker Gen.
Med. Corp. v. Daniel, 87 N.C. App. 659,663,362 S.E.2d 302,305 (1987) ("[T]his Court has
consistently held that one superior court may not overrule another."); Smithwick v.
Crutchfield, 87 N.C. App. 374, 377, 361 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1987) ("The law is clear that one
Superior Court judge may not reconsider and grant a motion for summary judgment
previously denied by another judge."); Jenkins v. Wheeler, 81 N.C. App. 512, 514, 344
S.E.2d 371, 373 (1986) ("One superior court judge may not overrule another.").
3. Two of the foremost authorities in federal civil procedure explained these policies
as follows:
A wide degree of freedom is often appropriate when the same question is
presented to different judges of a single district court. To be sure, unfettered
reexamination would unduly encourage efforts to shop rulings from one judge to
another, and might seem an undesirable denial of comity between colleagues.
Substantial freedom is desirable nonetheless, particularly since continued
proceedings may often provide a much improved foundation for deciding the
same issue.
18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4478, at 794 (1981).
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circumstances may change, issues may be resolved or clarified, and
better perspectives or understandings of how the trial should proceed
may evolve. The trial court's responsibility to ensure a fair trial
requires some flexibility in reconsidering intermediate orders entered
at earlier stages of the proceedings and certainly requires the
authority to correct manifest error in earlier intermediate rulings.
Nothing is gained, and much is sacrificed, if litigation must proceed in
accordance with an obviously erroneous interlocutory ruling only to
have the ruling corrected on appeal so that new litigation can
commence. 4  These competing concerns have resulted in the rule
followed by both the federal courts5 and a majority of the states6 that:
4. Cf. Dictograph Prods. Co. v. Sonotone Corp., 230 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1956). In
Dictograph, a successor judge granted summary judgment for the defendants despite a
previous denial of the motion by another judge. Judge Learned Hand considered
"whether the denial had become 'the law of the case,' [that] must be accepted thereafter
without re-examination." Id. at 134. Judge Hand noted that the denial of the motion for
summary judgment was not appealable and that the consequence of forbidding
reconsideration was that, if the denial was in error, the parties "would be compelled to
suffer the loss of time and money involved in a trial that from the outset was unnecessary."
Id. Judge Hand held that the successor judge had the discretion to reconsider and grant
the motion for summary judgment. See id. at 136.
5. See John Simmons Co. v. Grier Bros. Co., 258 U.S. 82, 88 (1922) (noting that, at
any time before final decree, the court may modify or rescind an interlocutory decree);
Avitia v. Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc., 49 F.3d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1995)
(explaining that a judge may reexamine a ruling given a strong and reasonable conviction
that it was wrong and if rescinding it will not cause undue harm to the party that had
benefited); Murr Plumbing, Inc. v. Scherer Bros. Fin., 48 F.3d 1066, 1070 (8th Cir. 1995)
(acknowledging the inherent power of the district court to reconsider and modify
interlocutory orders before entry of judgment because the "law of the case" doctrine
applies only to final judgments); In re Unioil, Inc., 962 F.2d 988, 993 (10th Cir. 1992)
(stating that when the court is convinced that the interlocutory ruling is substantially
erroneous "the only sensible thing to do is set itself right to avoid subsequent reversal");
Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 185 (5th Cir. 1990)
("[B]ecause the denial of a motion for summary judgment is an interlocutory order, the
trial court is free to reconsider and reverse its decision for any reason it deems sufficient,
even in the absence of new evidence or an intervening change in or clarification of the
substantive law."); Union Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 793 F.2d 1, 15 (1st Cir.
1986) (stating that the law of the case doctrine does not limit the power of a court to
change an interlocutory order at any time until the entry of judgment); see also FED. R.
Civ. P. 54(b) (providing that all decisions are "subject to revision at any time before the
entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the
parties"); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 4478, at 789 ("Although courts are often
eager to avoid reconsideration of questions once decided in the same proceeding, it is
clear that all federal courts retain power to reconsider if they wish."); Joan Steinman, Law
of the Case: A Judicial Puzzle in Consolidated and Transferred Cases and in Multidistrict
Litigation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 595, 599 (1987) ("[G]iven the federal trial courts'
unquestioned power to reconsider their earlier rulings ... [law of the case principles are
... best understood as rules of sensible and sound practice that permit logical progression
toward judgment, but that do not disable a court from altering prior interlocutory
decisions in a case."). But see Pit River Home and Agricultural Coop. v. United States, 30
1800 [Vol. 78
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although ordinarily a judge should hesitate to vacate,
modify, or depart from the interlocutory order or ruling of
another [judge] in the same case... [t]he general rule is that
a judgment which is merely interlocutory may be set aside or
modified even at a term subsequent to that at which it was
rendered, and that until the rendition of a final judgment the
interlocutory judgment remains within the control of the
court.7
F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 1994) (arguing that the law of the case doctrine applies to all
interlocutory orders). See generally John A. Glenn, Annotation, Propriety of Federal
District Judge's Overruling or Reconsidering Decision or Order Previously Made in Same
Case by Another District Judge, 20 A.L.R. FED. 13 (1974) (surveying the law of
reconsideration in the federal district courts).
6. See W.W. Allen, Annotation, Interlocutory Ruling or Order of One Judge as
Binding on Another in Same Case, 132 A.L.R. 14, 15 (1941); see also Breen v. Phelps, 439
A.2d 1066, 1075 (Conn. 1982) (stating that the trial "judge may, in a proper case, vacate,
modify or depart from the interlocutory order ... of another judge in the same case");
Nationsbank, N.A. v. Ziner, 726 So. 2d 364,366 n.1 (Fla. 1999) (noting that the "trial court
has inherent authority to reconsider any of its interlocutory rulings prior to final judgment
and the successor judge has the same authority... as the original judge"); Rowe v. State
Bank of Lombard, 531 N.E.2d 1358, 1363 (Ill. 1988) (stating that a successor judge had
authority to reconsider the denial of a motion for summary judgment made by a different
judge of the same court, even though no additional facts or changed circumstances were
presented); Otte v. Otte, 655 N.E.2d 76, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that the trial
court has the power to revisit prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any
circumstance, although the court should be loathe to do so absent extraordinary
circumstances); City of Wichita v. Rice, 889 P.2d 789, 794 (Kan. Ct. App. 1995) (stating
that an issue once decided should not be reconsidered unless it is clearly erroneous or
manifestly unjust but that a court retains the inherent power to do so even where the same
issue is presented to a different judge of the same court in the same case until entry of final
judgment); Peterson v. Hopson, 29 N.E.2d 140, 145 (Mass. 1940) ("But until final
judgment or decree there is no lack of power [to reconsider the order of the same or
another judge], and occasionally the power may properly be exercised."); Korberg v.
Kornberg, 525 N.W.2d 14, 18 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) ("A court has the power to revisit
prior decisions of its own or of a coordinate court in any circumstance, although as a rule
courts should be loathe to do so in the absence of extraordinary circumstances."); Johnson
v. Cyklop Strapping Corp., 531 A.2d 1078, 1081 (N.J. 1987) (stating that the "trial court
has inherent power, to be exercised in its sound discretion, to review, revise, reconsider,
and modify its interlocutory orders at any time prior to entry of final judgment"); State v.
Public Employees Retirement Bd., 882 P.2d 548, 551 (N.M. 1994) (noting that the trial
court has the inherent authority to reconsider its interlocutory orders and that such
reconsideration is proper even by the successor judge); Velez v. DeLara, 905 S.W.2d 43, 45
(Tex. App. 1995) (noting that the trial courts retain authority to reconsider any
interlocutory order until the judgment becomes final); Caldwell v. Caldwell, 350 S.E.2d
688, 691 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that until final judgment, interlocutory orders are left to
the plenary power of trial court). But see Harrity v. Medical College of Pa. Hosp., 653
A.2d 5, 8 (Pa. 1994) ("Where a motion has been presented and decided and where no new
facts are presented in a motion seeking the same relief, the first order should be followed
based on considerations of judicial economy and efficiency.").
7. Allen, supra note 6, at 15; see also Glenn, supra note 5, at 17-18 (stating that a
federal district judge should not overrule or reconsider an order of another in the same
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The majority rule is that judges do not lack the authority or
jurisdiction to reconsider if they believe it is proper, which means that
one superior court judge may overrule another.
North Carolina attorneys may be surprised to learn that North
Carolina also followed the majority rule for at least one hundred
years prior to the 1972 North Carolina Supreme Court case, Calloway
v. Motor Co.,8 which is consistently cited as holding that one judge
may not overrule another. The Calloway opinion failed to explain
why North Carolina should abandon the majority discretionary rule
in favor of a rigid jurisdictional rule; indeed, Calloway failed even to
recognize that much of its language could be read as challenging long-
established rules of the law of reconsideration. Nevertheless, this
interpretation of Calloway has, for the most part,9 remained
unchallenged by subsequent case law.
case, but may do so when there are good reasons). One source defines the rule as follows:
A trial court has discretionary power by leave of court to allow renewal of a
motion, to allow successive motions and to permit a motion which has been
denied to be revived and reconsidered. When a motion is before the court
pursuant to permission to renew after a previous denial, the court's power to
weigh the conflicting affidavits is the same as on the first consideration thereof,
and it has the power to re-examine the evidence and arrive at a different
conclusion if it thinks the ends of justice will be best served thereby.
56 AM. JUR. 2D Motions, Rules, and Orders § 28, at 22-23 (1971).
8. 281 N.C. 496, 189 S.E.2d 484 (1972).
9. First, it should be noted that Justice Higgins concurred only in the result in
Calloway. See id. at 506, 189 S.E.2d at 491 (Higgins, J., concurring in the result). One
wonders what troubled him about the rationale of Justice Sharp's opinion. It should also
be noted that several post-Calloway opinions nevertheless use language clearly associated
with the majority rule as stated in Bland. See, e.g., State v. Stokes, 308 N.C. 634, 642, 304
S.E.2d 184, 190 (1983) ("[An interlocutory] order or judgment is subject to change during
the pendency of the action to meet the exigencies of the case.") (emphasis added); State v.
Duvall, 304 N.C. 557, 562, 284 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1981) ("[T]he Court of Appeals correctly
stated the applicable law... concerning the general impropriety of a superior court judge's
rectification of what he might perceive to be legal error in the prior ruling of another
superior court judge in the same case.") (emphasis added); Holloway v. Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co., 109 N.C. App. 403,412,428 S.E.2d 453,458 (1993) (citing Calloway, 281 N.C. at
505, 189 S.E.2d at 490) ("[T]he trial court exercised proper deference towards that initial
ruling.") (emphasis added). The issue was also addressed in Justice Huskins's dissent in
State v. Fearing, 304 N.C. 499, 284 S.E.2d 479 (1981). Justice Huskins wrote:
I further dissent from.., the majority opinion in this case which holds that Judge
Brown had no authority to entertain and act upon the State's renewed motion...
for a special venire because Judge Browning had previously denied a similar
motion .... It is my view that Judge Brown was not bound by the interlocutory
order of Judge Browning and had authority, in his sound discretion as the trial
judge, to order a special venire of jurors from another county if he determined
such action was necessary to protect and promote the proper administration of
justice.
304 N.C. at 509-10, 284 S.E.2d at 486 (Huskins, J., dissenting).
RECONSIDERATION
Whatever its holding, however, a review of the cases cited in
Calloway suggests that the court may have misunderstood the issue
before it, misinterpreted the applicable precedent, and applied case
law that was not on point. This Article argues that Calloway merely
recognized the authority of a successor judge, given changed
conditions, to grant a motion to amend that had previously been
denied by another judge and need not have reached the question of a
successor judge's authority to reconsider an interlocutory order on
substantially similar facts. This reading contradicts interpretations of
Calloway that extrapolate from it the rule that one judge may not
overrule another.?0
Since Calloway, the North Carolina Supreme Court has
remained largely silent on the authority of judges to reconsider
interlocutory orders. The difficult task of crafting a coherent rule
governing reconsideration of interlocutory orders from the language
and analysis in Calloway has been left almost entirely to the court of
appeals. In the twenty-eight years since Calloway, however, the court
of appeals has failed to develop a functional rule that can be
consistently applied. The cause of this failure has not been the court
of appeals's lack of effort, but rather the difficulty of accommodating
the Calloway analysis. This Article contends that Calloway's
credibility and precedential value do not survive scrutiny. Because
Calloway is the only basis for North Carolina's minority rule, the
North Carolina courts should return to the majority rule-a rule that
arguably was never overruled and was always the better rule as a
matter of policy." Even if Calloway's rationale is followed, the case
10. See infra notes 195-280 and accompanying text.
11. The pros and cons of reopening matters already decided are well established.
First, reconsideration can be viewed as inefficient. See Carr v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp.,
49 N.C. App. 631, 636, 272 S.E.2d 374, 378 (1980) ("The conservation of judicial
manpower and the prompt disposition of cases are strong arguments against allowing
repeated hearings on the same legal issues."); 1B JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACrCE 0.404[1], at 11-3 (2d ed. 1996) ("[E]fficient disposition of the case
demands that each stage of the litigation build on the last, and not afford an opportunity
to reargue every previous ruling."). Second, reconsideration seems to encourage judge
shopping. See State v. Duvall, 304 N.C. 557,562,284 S.E.2d 495,498 (1981) (stating that if
reconsideration is allowed "the orderly trial process could be converted into a chaotic,
protracted affair as one party attempted to shop around for a more favorable ruling from
another superior court judge"). Finally, reconsideration can be viewed as unseemly. See
Calloway, 281 N.C. at 504, 189 S.E.2d at 490 (stating that a rule allowing reconsideration
"is logically indefensible and could serve only to undermine the considerations of orderly
procedure, courtesy and comity"). While these matters are important considerations that
require a judge to hesitate before reconsidering, more important policy considerations
argue against a strict jurisdictional rule. According to one commentator:
The primary value contending against absolute preclusion is that of the trial court
2000] 1803
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does not compel the North Carolina Court of Appeals's extensions of
the rule.
In Part I, this Article examines the nature of interlocutory orders
by addressing such orders' appealability and distinguishing the related
principles of res judicata and law of the case. Part I also places these
issues in the historical context of the North Carolina case law from
1800 to 1972. Part II analyzes the facts of Calloway, the issues
considered by the North Carolina Supreme Court in its opinion, and
the cases cited therein. Part III reviews the subsequent case law that
has interpreted and applied the Calloway analysis and argues that the
standard that has developed is not working. The Article concludes in
Part IV by recommending that North Carolina clarify, distinguish, or
disavow Calloway and return to the rule that, although she should
hesitate before doing so, one judge may overrule another.
I. INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS, APPEALABILITY, RES JUDICATA,
AND LAW OF THE CASE
Judgments and orders of the court fall into two classes: final
judgments and interlocutory orders.12 A final judgment disposes of
deciding correctly and wisely, thereby better serving the ends of justice, without
either distorting the law or treating litigants unfairly. The efficiency gained
through avoidance of appellate reversals and retrials is a valued by-product of
correct trial rulings. When reconsideration is particularly likely to correct an
erroneous ruling or to lead to a manifestly more just decision, the policies
supporting law of the case preclusion are outweighed.
Steinman, supra note 5, at 605. Steinman also observes:
[Mjere doubt as to the correctness of a prior ruling typically will not suffice to
elicit reconsideration. When there is "mere doubt," as opposed to a clear
conviction that a previous ruling was erroneous, there is no sufficient guarantee
that the trial court's second decision will be more correct, more just, or more
likely to stand up on appeal, to justify the various costs of reconsideration.
Id. at 605-06. See generally Allan D. Vestal, Law of the Case: Single-Suit Preclusion, 1967
UTAH L. REV. 1, 19 (1967) (discussing aspects of law of the case).
12. Some cases carefully note the distinction between an order and a judgment. See,
e.g., Hieb v. Lowery, 344 N.C. 403, 410, 474 S.E.2d 323, 327 (1996) (defining judgment);
Curry v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 125 N.C. App. 108, 112,479 S.E.2d 286, 289 (1997)
(" 'A judgment is a determination or declaration on the merits of the rights and
obligations of the parties to an action,' . .. and an order is 'every direction of a court not
included in a judgment.' ") (quoting Hunter v. City of Asheville, 80 N.C. App. 325, 327,
341 S.E.2d 743, 744 (1986)). But see State v. T.D.R., 347 N.C. 489, 495, 495 S.E.2d 700, 703
(1998) (interpreting the term "final order" in section 7A-666 of the North Carolina
General Statutes). The Code of Civil Procedure of North Carolina of 1868, so important
in the history of the law of reconsideration, codified the distinction between orders and
judgments. Under the code, "[e]very direction of a court or Judge, made or entered in
writing, and not included in a judgment, is denominated an order," N.C. CODE CIv. P.
§ 344 (1868), while a judgment was defined as "the final determination of the rights of the
parties in the action." Id. § 216. A well-regarded commentator has also recorded the
1804 [Vol. 78
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the cause as to all the parties, leaving nothing to be judicially
determined by the trial court. An interlocutory order, made while an
action is pending, does not dispose of the case, but requires further
action by the trial court to settle and determine the entire
controversy.13 Examples of interlocutory orders include rulings on
motions to amend pleadings, to strike, to sever, to certify as a class
action, to continue, for preliminary injunction, for special venire, for
individual voir dire, for summary judgment, on discovery orders, on
evidentiary rulings, as well as the denial of a 12(b)(6) motion to
dismiss.
Interlocutory orders build upon each other to guide the litigation
by clarifying and narrowing the issues as the matter proceeds through
trial to a final disposition. While the litigation will not proceed to a
final resolution if such intermediate orders are constantly revisited
and reconsidered, this concern does not require a rigid rule that such
orders are final and may never be reconsidered, modified, or
overruled. Circumstances, perspectives, and understandings of how
the trial should proceed may change, and issues may be resolved or
clarified as litigation progresses. The trial court's responsibility to
ensure a fair trial requires some flexibility in reconsidering
intermediate orders entered at earlier stages of the proceedings.
These competing concerns have resulted in a rule followed by both
the federal courts 4 and a majority of the states"5 that judges have the
discretionary authority to vacate, modify, or depart from the
interlocutory order of another judge in the same case, even at a
subsequent term, until the entry of a final judgment. 6
North Carolina adhered to the majority rule for most of its
history. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, a North
Carolina trial judge exercising equity jurisdiction had the power to
reconsider his orders 7 so long as such decisions remained within the
control of the court. An order remained in fieri -within the control
distinction, stating that "[a]n order is a mandate or determination of the court upon some
subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action, not disposing of the merits, but
adjudicating a preliminary point or directing some step in the proceedings." HENRY
CAMPBELL BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 1, at 5 (1902).
13. See Veazey v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357,362,57 S.E.2d 377,381 (1950).
14. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
15. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
16. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
17. Trial court judges even had the power to reconsider their judgments. See Kenon
v. Williamson, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 350, 352 (1796) ("Before it is finally pronounced and
recorded, any mistakes may be rectified by a rehearing granted upon petition for that
purpose, stating wherein the injustice is likely to happen.").
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of the court, sometimes said to be within the "breast of the court"--
until the end of the term at which the final judgment was enrolled. 8
Counsel secured a rehearing by certifying 9 in a petition20 that
reasonable cause2' for such rehearing existed.
After North Carolina amended its constitution in 1868 to provide
for the merger of common-law and equity practice - and mandated a
new code of civil procedure z3 the supreme court extended the
authority to reconsider in fieri orders to code practice. 4 Under these
cases a misapprehension of law or fact presented a proper casez for
18. One commentator noted that a decree is enrolled "as of the term in which the
final decree was passed" and that "judgments, decrees or other orders ... are under the
control of the court which pronounces them during the term at which they are rendered or
entered of record, and may then be set aside, vacated, modified or annulled by that court."
2 CHARLES FISK BEACH, JR., A TREATISE ON THE MODERN PRACTICE IN EQUITY § 831,
at 827-28 (1894). Thus, before enrollment, "the decree ... may be altered by a rehearing
before the same jurisdiction," JOHN ADAMS, THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITY 695 (2nd Am.
ed., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson 1852), but "as soon as [e]nrollment has taken place it
becomes a conclusive decree in Chancery, and can only be altered by an appellate
jurisdiction." Id at 696.
19. In Wilcox v. Wilkinson, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 11, 12-13 (1804), North Carolina adopted
the English practice of granting a petition for rehearing as a matter of course if certified by
counsel. See BEACH, supra note 18, § 830, at 833, 833 nn.4-5. Typically, counsel certified
that there was reasonable cause for rehearing, but was not required to state the specific
grounds. See ADAMS, supra note 18, at 700-01.
20. The procedure for "rectify[ing]" or "setting ... right" an order was argued by
counsel in Kenon v. Williamson, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 350, 351, 352 (1796) (contrasting bills of
review and rehearings); see also Edney v. Edney, 81 N.C. 1, 3 (1879) (distinguishing the
use of viva voce motion and written petition); BEACH, supra note 18, § 832, at 829 ("[A]n
interlocutory decree may be set aside in some cases on mere motion; in others by petition
for rehearing-the distinction ... not being clearly defined.").
21. See Walton v. Erwin, 36 N.C. (1 Ired. Eq.) 136, 140 (1840) (Ruffin, CJ.) (stating
that a court of concurrent jurisdiction will reconsider an order where "[t]here were no
means before the [first] court of forming a proper judgment, and hence the order must be
attributed to surprize or undue influence as an ex parte motion"); Ashe v. Moore, 6 N.C.
(2 Mur.) 383, 384 (1818) ("Every order made in the progress of a cause may be rescinded
or modified, upon a proper case being made out."); Wilcox, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) at 13, 14
(noting that a second rehearing may be allowed if there are substantial reasons against a
decree, or "if a justice of the case demands a re-hearing"); Kenon, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) at
351-52 (discussing counsel's argument that a rehearing is appropriate to correct an
interlocutory decree hastily or improvidently granted and stating that a rehearing is
acceptable for correcting the injustice of a decree mistakenly granted).
22. See N.C. CONST. art. 4, § 1 (1868).
23. See N.C. CONST. art. 4, § 2 (1868).
24. See Welch v. Kingsland, 89 N.C. 179, 181 (1883) (stating that the power to modify
erroneous orders during the progress of a cause "was a well settled rule in the courts of
equity, but must be equally applicable to the present practice, which in its essential
features, conforms to that prevailing in those courts"); Love & Co. v. Young, 69 N.C. 65,
66 (1873) (justifying the reconsideration of a post-1868 case by noting that "[a]ccording to
the old equity practice, petitions to rehear were of every-day occurrence").
25. This rule appeared in leading secondary sources of the late 19th and early 20th
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reconsideration even upon substantially similar facts-thus allowing
correction by the trial court of any erroneous or unjust order.26 In
1873 the court stated:
We are not aware of any rule of law which forbids his
Honor, at Spring Term, 1873, from reconsidering an
interlocutory order made at Fall Term, 1872. According to
the old equity practice, petitions to rehear were of every-day
occurrence. If, while the proceeding was pending, the Judge
became satisfied, that because of the insufficiency of the
affidavit, or for other reason, the case was not properly
centuries. For example, Professor Black asserted that rulings on motions incidental or
collateral to the main controversy "are not technically binding on the court, as the law 6f
the case, except that, as between the same parties and on the same showing of facts, the
court is not required to consider the same question a second time." HENRY CAMPBELL
BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS OR THE SCIENCE OF CASE
LAW § 86, at 280 (1912). But Black goes on to explain that "at the same time, if the court
doubts the correctness of its former ruling, or desires a more thorough investigation of the
question involved, it is no abuse of its discretion to permit the same question to be re-
opened in another form." Id § 86, at 281. Another noted authority, Professor A.C.
Freeman, observed that the reasons for allowing discretionary reconsideration apply only
to those proceedings from which no redress can be obtained by appeal, thus creating the
possibility that misapprehension or inadvertence of the judge might cause grievous wrong.
See A.C. FREEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 326, at 350 (2nd ed., San
Francisco, A.L. Bancroft & Co. 1874) (citations omitted). A legal encyclopedia of the era
describes the rule as such: "Leave to reargue will be granted where it appears that there is
some decision or some principle of law which would have a controlling effect and which
has been overlooked or that there has been a misapprehension of facts, but not
otherwise." 14 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PLEADING AND PRACTICE Motions § 14, at 174
(William M. McKinney ed., Long Island, Edward Thompson Co. 1899); see also id. § 15, at
189 (surveying states' practice as to when leave will be granted for renewal of motions).
26. For relevant North Carolina cases, see Revis v. Ramsey, 202 N.C. 815, 816, 164
S.E. 358, 358 (1932) (holding that where the first judge perhaps misapprehended the
defendant's answer, the succeeding judge could exercise his discretion to grant a renewal
of the motion to amend to set up the statute of limitations); Bland v. Faulkner, 194 N.C.
427, 429, 139 S.E. 835, 836 (1927) (correcting ex mero motu a perceived error of law and
declining to submit to the jury issues directed to it by the preceding judge); State v.
Dewey, 139 N.C. 556, 559, 51 S.E. 937, 938 (1905) (holding that it was within the power of
the same judge to grant in his discretion a motion for bill of particulars that had been
denied at an earlier term because the order was not res judicata); Allison v. Whittier, 101
N.C. 490, 496, 8 S.E. 338, 340 (1888) (stating that the same judge could reconsider an order
upon further reflection or upon fuller information, such that "what may one day be
refused may the next day be granted"); Maxwell v. Blair, 95 N.C. 317, 321 (1886) (stating
that where an interlocutory decree for a sale of land contained an error, the clerk had the
power to correct his earlier order of sale); Welch, 89 N.C. at 181 (holding that the court
had the power to entertain a motion to vacate a prior order that was allegedly erroneous
due to lack of jurisdiction of the prior judge and that the court should exercise its
discretion "to promote the ends of justice"); Mebane v. Mebane, 80 N.C. 34, 41 (1879)
(stating that although counsel couched the issue as relief from final judgment, an order on
foreclosure of a mortgage was interlocutory and was thus modifiable to prevent serious
and irremediable injury); Love, 69 N.C. at 66 (allowing a motion to dismiss after the same
judge had denied the motion as matter of law at the prior term).
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constituted before him, it was his duty to dismiss the
proceeding, notwithstanding he at Fall Term, 1872, failed to
take the same view of the case.27
A. Appealability of Interlocutory Orders Pending Entry of Final
Judgment
The status of interlocutory orders pending entry of final
judgment differs significantly from the status of such orders after
entry of final judgment because, as a general rule, interlocutory
orders are not reviewable or correctable by the appellate courts until
after the final judgment has been entered. As the North Carolina
Supreme Court has explained:
While final judgments are always appealable, interlocutory
decrees are immediately appealable only when they affect
some substantial right of the appellant and will work an
injury to him if not corrected before an appeal from final
judgment .... "A nonappealable interlocutory order ...
which involves the merits and necessarily affects the
judgment, is reviewable ... on appropriate exception upon
an appeal from the final judgment in the cause .... " These
rules are designed to prevent fragmentary and premature
appeals that unnecessarily delay the administration of justice
and to ensure that the trial divisions fully and finally dispose
of the case before an appeal can be heard .... "There is no
more effective way to procrastinate the administration of
justice than that of bringing cases to an appellate court
piecemeal through the medium of successive appeals from
intermediate orders."28
Thus, the reason that the principle that no appeal lies from one
superior court judge to another does not apply to interlocutory
orders, and the reason for distinguishing interlocutory orders from
final judgments at all, is because interlocutory orders are not typically
immediately appealable. If interlocutory orders need reviewing and
correcting during the progress of the case, the trial court must take
such action because the rules prohibit immediate appeal. The
27. Love, 69 N.C. at 66. In Love, the appellant argued that the denial of the motion to
dismiss at the fall term was "final and conclusive" Id. (citing Brown v. Hawkins, 68 N.C.
444,445 (1873)). Love noted that in Brown the decision that could not be reconsidered by
another superior court judge was a final judgment-not an interlocutory order as in the
case at bar. See id.
28. Bailey v. Gooding, 301 N.C. 205, 209, 270 S.E.2d 431, 434 (1980) (quoting Veazey
v. Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 362-63, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950)); see also N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-27 (1999) (addressing the appealability of interlocutory orders); id. at § 1-277
(addressing the appealability of interlocutory orders).
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supreme court expressly acknowledged this division of review and
correction authority in Lutz v. Cline,29 in which the court stated that
alleged error in interlocutory orders that are not immediately
appealable may be "passed upon ... either by the superior court in
correcting its own errors, or by this court upon appeal" after final
judgment. 0
Erroneous or ill-advised interlocutory orders that need
correcting to provide a fair trial should be corrected, if possible, in
time to provide that the trial is fair the first time the matter is tried.3'
Only the trial court can provide this timely review and correction of
interlocutory orders that are not immediately appealable. There is no
conflict with appellate review because the interlocutory orders that
determine how the case is tried-even if such orders are reconsidered
and modified during the litigation-will be subject to appellate review
after the trial is complete and final judgment entered. The appellate
court is positioned to consider whether the trial was fair and whether
any final 2 interlocutory order unduly prejudiced the proceedings.
The existence or legitimacy of a tentative interlocutory order that was
subsequently reconsidered and modified or overruled should rarely
be a matter for the appellate court's attention. The appellate court
will only be concerned with the legitimacy of the interlocutory orders
that actually guided the litigation.
The rule that interlocutory orders may be reconsidered is based
upon the unavailability of the appeals process to cure a correctable
29. 89 N.C. 186 (1883).
30. Id. at 187; see also FREEMAN, supra note 25, § 325, at 350 ("The reasons assigned
for investing courts with a discretionary power in rehearing matters decided upon a
motion are applicable only to those proceedings from which no redress can be obtained by
appeal.").
31. It is simply more efficient to allow the trial court to reconsider interlocutory
orders as necessary than it is to lock the court into its erroneous or hasty orders and then
await correction at the appellate level. One commentator states the following:
Regardless of rulings which have been made in a given case, the [trial] court
knows that on appeal, incorrect rulings of law are subject to reversal. It seems
obviously wasteful of the court's time to proceed to adjudicate a case using
incorrect principles because of the reversal which will probably occur. This
means that a [trial] court should apply the correct law regardless of earlier rulings
on the matter. If the correct law is known through decided cases by controlling
courts, then the trial court has no choice.
Vestal, supra note 11, at 19; see also Allen, supra note 6, at 16 ("[W]here no direct appeal
lies from the previous erroneous ruling, [continuing the litigation on a defective
foundation] may entail a serious waste of time, labor and expense.").
32. An interlocutory order would become "final" upon entry of the final judgment in
the case. At that point the interlocutory order would no longer be within the control of
the trial court and would be subject to appeal along with the final judgment.
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order in a timely manner. If the appeals process is available,
however, reconsideration need not be allowed and different rules
might apply. In the early 1800s, appeal by right was available once
there was a final judgment.33 This changed, however, when in 1868 a
new code of civil procedure34 authorized immediate appeal-appeal
prior to final judgment-of an interlocutory order when the order was
made as a matter of law and affected a substantial right. Certain
interlocutory orders thus became immediately reviewable by the
appellate courts prior to final judgment. It was not obvious, however,
which interlocutory orders affected a substantial right.
The substantial right 6 provision of the new appeal statute
37
33. See infra note 59.
34. The North Carolina Constitution of 1868 mandated the new code of civil
procedure. See N.C. CONST. art. 4, § 2 ("Three Commissioners shall be appointed by [the]
Convention to report to the General Assembly ... rules of practice and procedure in
accordance with the provisions of the foregoing section .... "). The Ordinance of the
Convention of 1868 Appointing Code Commissioners was ratified March 13, 1868; the
First Report of the Code Commissioners was raced to the General Assembly on July 15,
1868; and the second report followed on its heels on August 31, 1868. As the Second
Report states, "the Commissioners did not hesitate to take the Code of New York as the
basis of that to be prepared for this State .... " SECOND REPORT OF THE CODE OF
COMMISSIONERS (Aug. 31, 1868) (in N.C. CODE CiV. P., AUTHORIZATION, xiv, xvi
(1868)).
35. See N.C. CODE CiV. P. § 299 (1868). The Code read:
An appeal may be taken from every judicial order or determination of a Judge of
a Superior Court, upon or involving a matter of law or legal inference, whether
made in or out of term, which affects a substantial right claimed in any action or
proceeding; or which in effect determines the action, and prevents a judgment
from which an appeal might be taken; or discontinues the action, or grants or
refuses a new trial, [sic]
Id. Under code practice, the phrase "substantial right" refers to matters of substance
rather than matters of mere form, see 3 C.J. Appeal & Error § 265, at 454 (1915) (citations
omitted), and the term "substantial" has been said to exclude rulings on merely technical
points. See BLACK, supra note 12, § 22, at 34. The language "in effect determines the
action, and prevents a judgment from which an appeal might be taken" is traced to
common law practice. Id. § 21, at 33 ("Under the common law system .... an order which
does not settle and conclude the rights involved in the action, and does not deny the party
the means of further prosecuting or defending the suit, is not so far final as to be a proper
subject of appeal.") (citations omitted). For cases interpreting clauses of this statute in
North Carolina and other code states, see 3 C.J. Appeal & Error § 265, at 454-55 & n.22
(1915) (discussing the "substantial right" clause); id. § 266, at 455 nn.24 & 27-28
(discussing the "in effect determines the action" clause). The language from the Code of
1868 may be compared to current statutory provisions. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-27(b),
1-277 (1999).
36. Courts have struggled with developing a test to determine which interlocutory
orders should be immediately appealable. The "substantial right" test "is more easily
stated than applied" and must usually be determined "in each case by considering the
particular facts of that case and the procedural context in which the order from which
appeal is sought was entered." Waters v. Qualified Personnel, Inc., 294 N.C. 200, 208, 240
S.E.2d 338, 343 (1978). See generally J. Brad Donovan, The Substantial Right Doctrine and
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received considerable attention in the century that North Carolina
operated under the code of civil procedure. Interpretation of the
provision initially found the North Carolina Supreme Court focusing
on the right of immediate review from orders concerning provisional
remedies? The status of orders related to pleadings, such as rulings
on the pleading of written demurrer39 or orders on motion to strike,
also arose. These issues proved difficult to resolve; as a result, the
court found itself reduced at one time or another to invoking
"established practice" to explain the appealability of orders on
motion to strike and decisions on demurrer.40 In the wake of these
Interlocutory Appeals, 17 CAMPBELL L. REV. 71 (1995) (summarizing the North Carolina
cases applying the substantial right test); Robert J. Martineau, Defining Finality and
Appealability By Court Rule: Right Problem, Wrong Solution, 54 U. PITr. L. REV. 717
(1993) (discussing the federal final judgment rule and the statutory and judicially created
exceptions that allow immediate appeal of some interlocutory orders); John C. Nagel,
Replacing the Crazy Quilt of Interlocutory Appeals Jurisprudence With Discretionary
Review, 44 DUKE L.J. 200 (1994) (criticizing the attempts of federal courts to create a
formula that would predictably and accurately decide whether or not a given interlocutory
order should be eligible for immediate appeal); Willis Whichard, Appealability in North
Carolina: Common Law Definition of the Statutory Substantial Right Doctrine, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 123 (1984) (outlining the North Carolina cases applying the substantial
right test).
37. Although this Article concentrates on the immediate appealability of orders under
the substantial right provision of the new appeal statute, other statutes under the Code of
Civil Procedure of North Carolina and subsequent codifications, or under court rules,
supporting immediate review of orders, may relate to the law of reconsideration. See, e.g.,
N.C. Sup. Cr. R. PRACr. 4(a)(2) (1974 Cum. Supp.) (remaining in effect until July 1,
1975).
38. See Baker v. Garris, 108 N.C. 218, 226, 13 S.E. 2, 4 (1891). In summarizing prior
case law, Baker notes:
[C]ertain interlocutory orders-such as the appointment of receivers, motions to
vacate attachments, orders of arrest, and the like-were held to be res judicata
unless affidavits were presented showing additional facts subsequently
transpiring. Provisional adjudications of this character are mere incidents to an
action, the ultimate rights of the parties being tried upon issues of law or fact
raised by the pleadings.
Id.
39. There had been a distinction in North Carolina law between formal (or written)
demurrer and oral demurrer (sometimes called demurrer ore tenus). Demurrer ore tenus
was not a demurrer at all, but was equivalent to a motion to dismiss, and if overruled, was
not the subject of immediate appeal. See Power Co. v. Peacock, 197 N.C. 735, 737-38, 150
S.E. 510, 511 (1929). See generally 3 C.J. Appeal & Error § 312, at 486 n.19[k] (1915)
(distinguishing demurrer ore tenus in North Carolina from written demurrers, the former
not being appealable); ATWELL CAMPBELL MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACrICE
AND PROCEDURE IN CIVIL CASES § 445, at 446-47 (1929) (discussing types of demurrers);
id. § 676, at 772-73 (discussing the appealability of both types of demurrer).
40. Regarding resort to "established practice" as an explanation of the appealability
of grants or denials of demurrer, see MCINTOSH, supra note 39, § 676, at 772 (citing
Commissioners of Wake County v. Magnin, 78 N.C. 181, 185 (1878)). Professor McIntosh
states that "We have, however, over and over again entertained appeals from such orders
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difficulties, the North Carolina Supreme Court ultimately subjected
each class of decision to a court rule that provided for review only by
writ of certiorari.4 '
Thus, in cases in which there is a final judgment or where an
interlocutory order is immediately reviewable because it affects a
substantial right, the appellate court may correct any error in the
interlocutory order, and the rule allowing reconsideration of the
interlocutory orders at the trial level need not apply. Well-known
principles of law address how lower courts must respond to
appealable or appealed orders or judgments, but these principles are
not applicable to the established law of reconsideration.
Nevertheless, this distinction was (and is) sometimes overlooked or
misunderstood, occasionally resulting in confusion and misstatement
of the applicable principles of law. Res judicata, law of the case, and
acquiescence are powerful principles that address the relationship
between the appellate and trial courts. They do not, however,
address the relationship between trial judges presiding at different
stages of the same litigation, and they do not apply to the issue of
reconsideration of mere interlocutory orders as described herein.
[overruling a demurrer]; and although it may admit of doubt... yet is a matter of practice
which experience can best test. But it ought not to be left at sea to wreck legal
navigation." Id. A number of cases support the proposition that the same explanation
applied to the appealability of orders on motions to strike. See Hill v. Stansbury, 221 N.C.
339, 341-42,20 S.E.2d 308, 309 (1942) ("Some doubt has been expressed whether an order
denying a motion to strike under C. S., 537, is immediately appealable .... However this
may be, the established practice authorizes the appeal.") (citations omitted); Parrish v.
Atlantic Coastline R.R. Co., 221 N.C. 292, 296, 20 S.E.2d 299, 302 (1942) (stating that the
"right to appeal immediately in such cases seems to be firmly established"); Virginia Trust
Co. v. Dunlop, 214 N.C. 196, 199, 198 S.E. 645, 647 (1938) ("We are not sure of plaintiff's
right to appeal on this [denial of motion to strike further defense] under C. S., 638 ....
But since the holding is adverse to plaintiff's contention, and the appeal has precedent, we
prefer to decide the matter upon the merits.").
41. See N.C. Sup. Cr. R. PRAcr. 4(a)(2) (1974 Cum. Supp.) (remaining in effect until
July 1, 1975). The writ was grounded in "conceived prejudice" on final hearing for orders
allowing or denying a motion to strike allegations in pleadings and grounded in
"conceived prejudice" to a substantial right for orders overruling most demurrers. See id.
Immediate appeal still lay from orders sustaining a demurrer. See, e.g., Cecil v. High
Point, Thomasonite & Denton R.R., 266 N.C. 728, 730, 147 S.E.2d 223, 225 (1966)
(holding that orders on motions to strike portions of a complaint were immediately
reviewable by certiorari only, while orders on motions to strike an entire cause of action,
plea in bar, or entire defense, were immediately appealable as a sustained demurrer);
Mercer v. Hilliard, 249 N.C. 725, 728, 107 S.E.2d 554, 556 (1959) ("Rule 4(a) ... limits the
right of immediate appeal only in instances where the demurrer is overruled.") (emphasis
added). It is important to note that Rule 4 expanded the definition of acquiescence,
discussed infra in section I.C., to include failure to petition an appellate court for writ of
certiorari under Rule 4.
1812 [Vol. 78
RECONSIDERATION
B. Res Judicata and Law of the Case
Res judicata or claim preclusion precludes a second lawsuit when
the same claim is involved, when the suit is between the same parties
or those in privity with them, and when there was a final judgment on
the merits in the earlier action.42 Res judicata is inapplicable to
reconsideration because it requires a final judgment-meaning that
all decisions of the trial court are final and fully subject to appeal.
Collateral estoppel or issue preclusion provides that once an issue of
ultimate fact has been determined by a valid and final judgment the
issue may not be relitigated by the same parties in a subsequent
action.43 Issue preclusion is inapplicable to reconsideration because it
also requires a final judgment which is fully subject to appeal. As our
supreme court has stated, "res adjudicata does not extend to ordinary
motions incidental to the progress of a cause, for what may one day
be refused may the next be granted."'  Once a final judgment is
entered, all interlocutory orders become final and subject to appeal.
The rules governing reconsideration of interlocutory orders
apply only so long as there is no final judgment entered.
Reconsideration of a final judgment is not allowed except in the
limited context of reconsideration during the session at which the
judgment was entered45 or "reconsideration" as allowed pursuant to
Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60,46 or pursuant to motions for
appropriate relief.47 Once the session is over and the final judgment is
truly final, it is subject to review for error only by appeal and is not
subject to reconsideration.'
42. See Howerton v. Grace Hosp., Inc., 130 N.C. App. 327, 330, 502 S.E.2d 659, 661
(1998).
43. See State v. Adams, 347 N.C. 48,61,490 S.E.2d 220,226 (1997).
44. Mabry v. Henry, 83 N.C. 298,301 (1880).
45. During the session at which they were entered, even final judgments are in fieri.
See State v. Quick, 106 N.C. App. 548, 561, 418 S.E.2d 291, 299 (1992) (holding that judges
can modify their own orders or final judgments during the same term); see also State v.
Adcock, 310 N.C. 1, 14, 310 S.E.2d 587, 595 (1984) (stating that a trial judge may change
his ruling on admissibility of evidence during the course of the trial).
46. See Lumsden v. Lawing, 117 N.C. App. 514, 517, 451 S.E.2d 659, 661 (1995)
(holding that, upon remand from the court of appeals, the trial court had no jurisdiction to
alter or modify its final judgment, which had been upheld on appeal, except as allowed
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(6)); Garrison ex rel. Chavis v. Barnes, 117 N.C. App. 206, 210, 450
S.E.2d 554,557 (1994) (stating that the appropriate remedy for errors of law committed by
the court is either appeal or a timely motion for relief under Rule 59(a)(8), and not Rule
60(b)).
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-1411 to 1SA-1422 (1999).
48. See Smith v. Johnson, 125 N.C. App. 603,607,481 S.E.2d 415,417 (1997) ("Having
determined... that the motion is merely a request that the trial court reconsider its earlier
decision and having determined that it does not qualify as a Rule 59(e) motion, and
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Although courts occasionally define law of the case to encompass
reconsideration, it is inapplicable because, in its traditional form,
49
there must have been an appeal even if no final judgment. Law of the
case requires that an issue actually decided by the appellate court be
binding on the trial court if the cause is heard again at the trial level."
When an appellate court remands a case for further proceedings, its
decisions in the opinion become the law of the case, "both in the
subsequent proceedings in the trial court and upon a later appeal,
where the same facts and the same questions of law are involved. '51
C. Acquiescence or Imputed Law of the Case
There is another aspect of law of the case analysis that impacts
reconsideration, often referred to as acquiescence, although it might
more accurately be called imputed law of the case. Imputed law of
the case extends law of the case consequences to issues that could
have been appealed but were not. In other words, the party had the
right to appeal but did not do so and therefore acquiesced in the
order's finality. Courts applied imputed law of the case in the
following instances: (1) "The grant of the directed verdict in the first
trial was a final judgment on the merits .... [Plaintiff] did not appeal
from that judgment and that judgment thus became the law of the
case on that claim and is 'binding upon the court in the second
trial;' )52 (2) "[Defendants] did not except to this ruling or pursue an
appeal. Accordingly, it became the law of the case;' '53 and (3) "The
because there are no other provisions for motions for reconsideration [of final judgments],
the motion was properly denied."). Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 60, as well as motions
for appropriate relief, do give another (or the same) trial judge authority to overturn a
final judgment, but these are not a substitute for the appellate process. See id.
49. Traditional law of the case is vertical: actual determinations of a higher court in a
given case will bind a lower court upon remand. Yet, law of the case is sometimes used to
include the reconsideration of unappealed interlocutory orders, considering the effect of
one judge's determination on the subsequent determination in the same case of another
judge of coordinate jurisdiction. This "horizontal" law of the case involves different
considerations and principles from vertical law of the case. This Article uses law of the
case to refer solely to vertical law of the case, although many commentators and appellate
judges do not follow this limited definition. See, e.g., Vestal, supra note 11, at 15
("Encompassed within the 'law of the case' is the situation where a trial court has ruled on
a matter and the same matter is raised a second time at the trial level.").
50. See Grantham v.'R.G. Barry Corp., 127 N.C. App. 529, 532, 491 S.E.2d 678, 680
(1997).
51. Sloan v. Miller Bldg. Corp., 128 N.C. App. 37,41,493 S.E.2d 460,463 (1997).
52. Pack v. Randolph Oil Co., 130 N.C. App. 335, 337, 502 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1998)
(quoting Duffer v. Royal Dodge, Inc., 51 N.C. App. 129, 130,275 S.E.2d 206,207 (1981)).




defendant did not appeal from this order. It became, therefore, the
law of the case, and other district judges were without authority to
enter orders to the contrary."54 Traditional law of the case requires
that the appellate court actually addressed the issue that binds the
lower court, while acquiescence or imputed law of the case requires
only that the issue could have been the subject of an appeal but was
not.
This analysis complicates the law of reconsideration because of
the rule that interlocutory orders made as a matter of law can be
immediately reviewed if they affect a substantial right.55 Thus, if a
dissatisfied party, who could have immediately appealed a judge's
interlocutory order but instead chose not to do so, asks the trial judge
to reconsider the order, imputed law of the case may prevent such
reconsideration. 6 This was the situation in an 1880 case:
Motions made in the progress of a cause to facilitate the
trial, but which involve no substantial right and the decision
of which is not subject to appeal to this court, may be
renewed as subsequent events require, and are not
obstructed by the former action of the court. But if the
decision does affect a substantial right and may be reviewed
and corrected on appeal, and the complaining party
acquiesces, we see no reason why the decision should not be
as conclusive of the matters decided as the determination of
the action itself would be of the whole controversy.
5 7
In a subsequent case, the North Carolina Supreme Court noted
that there are many motions incidental to the progress of a cause that
facilitate the trial but that are not subject to immediate appeal. But
when a motion is made involving "a substantial right and is
reviewable by appeal, but not appealed from, the decision must be as
conclusive as a final judgment in the action."5"
The issue of acquiescence first arose in North Carolina when the
state's rules of civil procedure adopted a new appeals provision for
54. Johnson v. Johnson, 7 N.C. App. 310,313, 172 S.E.2d 264,266 (1970).
55. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-277, 7A-27(d) (1999); see also infra notes 31-54 and
accompanying text.
56. The unappealed interlocutory order might still be appealed subsequently as a part
of the appeal from the final judgment. According to Wright and Miller, "[t]he fact that
appeal might have been taken ... under an interlocutory appeal statute ... should not
preclude ... review on appeal from a traditional final judgment. The opportunity for an
earlier appeal is intended to protect the appellant, not to forfeit the right to later review."
WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 4433, at 307-08.
57. Sanderson v. Daily, 83 N.C. 67,69-70 (1880).
58. Roulhac v. Brown, 87 N.C. 1, 4 (1882).
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certain interlocutory orders. 9  Orders reviewable under this
provision, but in which the aggrieved party acquiesced by not
pursuing the immediate appeal, were held to be res judicata6° and
thus were not permitted to be reconsidered on substantially similar
facts. The court invoked this prohibition most forcefully in cases of
reconsideration by successor judges,61 for an immediately appealable
order reconsidered by a successor judge raised the specter of judge-
shopping62 and of unseemly conflicts between judges.63
59. Between 1831 and 1868, litigants had the right to seek from the trial court
certification for review of interlocutory orders. See 1 REVISED STATUTES OF THE STATE
OF NORTH CAROLINA §§ 23,28 (1837).
60. Apparently, in late 19th century cases in North Carolina, the expression "law of
the case" was not consistently distinguished from "res judicata." See, e.g., Jones v.
Southern Ry. Co., 131 N.C. 133, 135, 42 S.E. 559, 560 (1902) ("From this there was no
dissent, and by the unanimous opinion of this Court it became res judicata the law of the
case."); Kramer v. Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 128 N.C. 269, 269-70, 38 S.E. 872, 872
(1901) ("The point decided on the former appeal is resjudicata in this case between these
parties. It was the duty of the Judge below to follow our decision."); Wright v. Southern
Ry. Co., 128 N.C. 77, 79, 38 S.E. 283, 283 (1901) ("After this express decision on former
appeal in this same case .... the present appeal is neither more nor less than an attempt to
review the former ruling.., by a second appeal presenting the same point, and this is not
allowable." (citations omitted)); Warden v. McKinnon, 99 N.C. 251, 254, 5 S.E. 917, 919
(1888) ("Having been settled on that appeal, it was res adjudicata, and is not the subject of
our review on this.").
61. Note that a mere interlocutory order remaining within the control of the court
might be reconsidered by a successor judge without offending "the principle that no
appeal lies from one judge of the Superior Court to another." Bland v. Faulkner, 194 N.C.
427, 429, 139 S.E. 835, 836 (1927); cf. 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PLEADING AND PRACICE
Motions 179 (1899) (stating that leave of court is required for reargument on the same
state of facts, whether the motion for leave was presented to the same or a different
judge); id. at 187 (stating that a motion for leave to renew may be made to the same or a
different judge). Not only has modern North Carolina practice permitted reconsideration
before a different judge, at least in the context of a mere interlocutory order, pre-code
equity practice seems to have preferred rehearing before a different bane of judges. See
Wilcox v. Wilkinson, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 11, 12-13 (1804) ("It appears that this cause ... has
been once reheard; but that circumstance does not appear, in itself, of such decisive weight
as to prevent a rehearing, more especially as it must have been at the time reheard by the
same judges that made the decree.").
62. See Henry v. Hilliard, 120 N.C. 479,487-88,27 S.E. 130, 132 (1897) ("They waited
for another Judge to come around and took their chances with him. He reviewed and
overruled [his predecessor]. 'Such unseemly conflict as this' will not be tolerated by this
court.") (citing Roulhac v. Brown, 87 N.C. 1, 4 (1882).).
63. See, e.g., Henry, 120 N.C. at 487-88,27 S.E. at 132 (quoting Roulhac, 87 N.C. at 4
(quoting State v. Evans, 74 N.C. 324,325 (1876))); Mabry v. Henry, 83 N.C. 298,302 (1880)
(quoting Evans, 74 N.C. at 325, to the same effect); State v. Evans, 74 N.C. 324, 325 (1876)
("So we have the conflicting rulings.., in the very same case-in fact, one Judge reverses
the decision of the other Judge. How is this unseemly conflict of decision to be
prevented? It can only be done by enforcing the rule, res adjudicata."). The reviewability
of Evans seems to have been based on the court's unstated presumption that "an order
denying a criminal defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds is directly
appealable." 4 AM. JUR. 2D Appellate Review § 239, at 852 (1995). No case prior to 1876
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The concept of acquiescence under North Carolina law was
expanded by court rule in the mid-twentieth century. With the
adoption of Rule 4 of the Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court,
allowing for review by writ of certiorari of certain orders on motions
to strike and on demurrer,' acquiescence came to include failure to
petition an appellate court for writ of certiorari under this rule.
It is important to note, however, that neither the prohibition
against reconsideration of an order in which one has acquiesced (nor,
for that matter, the requirement of a proper case for reconsideration
of an order not immediately reviewable) prevented a judge from
reconsidering a matter based on new facts or conditions that arose
after the initial motion." When the renewal of a motion is based on
has been found which adopts this rule for North Carolina. It is interesting to note that in a
recent interpretation of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1444(d), the supreme court held the
denial of a motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds to be interlocutory and
unappealable. See State v. Shoff, 342 N.C. 638, 638, 466 S.E.2d 277, 277 (1996) (per
curiam).
64. See N.C. Sup. Cr. R. PRACr. 4(a)(2) (1974 Cum. Supp.) (remaining in effect until
July 1, 1975).
65. See 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PLEADING AND PRACrICE Motions 181-82 (1899); see
also BLACK, supra note 25, § 88, at 286-89 ("A former decision will not stand as the law of
the case and prevent a further consideration of the questions involved, when new facts or
materially different evidence are presented at a subsequent stage of the case, which legally
differentiate the case as then presented from that formerly decided."). Not all subsequent
conditions will suffice, however. See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 25, § 88, at 288 (stating that
the court is "not required to enter upon a re-examination of the whole question in a
second case on the same evidence or on additional evidence which is merely cumulative");
FREEMAN, supra note 25, § 325, at 350 (quoting Ray v. Connor, 3 Edw. Ch. 478, 479 (N.Y.
Ch. 1841)) ("'Affidavits which merely present additional or cumulative evidence on the
points before presented, are not to be considered as showing new grounds for a
motion.' ").
Many late-19th century cases acknowledge that mere interlocutory orders may be
reconsidered on subsequent facts. See Miller v. Justice, 86 N.C. 26, 30 (1882) (stating that
the court had the power to modify an interlocutory decree "to meet the justice and equity
of the case, upon sufficient grounds shown for the same," such as where the prior order of
accounting had not been complied with and further information by affidavits showed rapid
devaluation of partnership properties); Sanderson v. Daily, 83 N.C. 67, 69-70 (1880)
(stating that motions made in the progress of a cause ... may be renewed as subsequent
events require") (dicta); Shinn v. Smith, 79 N.C. 310, 314 (1878) (relying on affidavits
providing fuller information as to ownership of the lands ordered sold as the basis for
modification of the order). Immediately appealable orders also could be reconsidered on
subsequent facts. See Baker v. Garris, 108 N.C. 219, 227, 13 S.E. 2, 4 (1891) ("In these
cases certain interlocutory orders-such as the appointment of receivers, motions to
vacate attachments, orders of arrest, and the like-were held to be res judicata unless
affidavits were presented showing additional facts subsequently transpiring.") (referring to
the acquiescence cases of Wingo v. Hooper, 98 N.C. 482, 4 S.E. 463 (1887), Roulhac, 87
N.C. at 1, and Sanderson, 83 N.C. at 67; and referring to the law of the case examples of
Pasour v. Lineberger, 90 N.C. 159 (1884), Mabry, 83 N.C. at 298, and Jones v. Thorne, 80
N.C. 72 (1879)).
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subsequent conditions, the new motion presents a different question
from that considered in the first motion, and, strictly speaking,
acquiescence is irrelevant because the consideration of the renewal is
not a reconsideration of the unappealed interlocutory order.
D. Summary
Res judicata, law of the case, and acquiescence principles apply
to situations that involve the relationship between the appellate and
trial courts. They do not apply to situations that only involve the
relationship between trial judges presiding at different stages of the
same litigation. Yet, appellate courts have sometimes mistakenly
applied the rules applicable to res judicata, law of the case, or
acquiescence to situations involving the reconsideration of
interlocutory orders in which there was no final judgment, no actual
appeal, and no unexercised right to immediate appeal. When this
occurs, the applicable discretionary rule of restraint (that a judge
should hesitate to reconsider an interlocutory order) can be
mistakenly described as an absolute rule of jurisdiction (that a judge
has no authority to reconsider an interlocutory order).66 Such a
transformation is doubly mistaken, however, because the principles of
res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case are all generally
viewed as powerful rules of practice that guide discretion, not as rules
of jurisdiction.67
By the early 1970s, the law of reconsideration had evolved into a
cogent legal doctrine. Mere interlocutory orders-orders that were
not immediately appealable-could be reconsidered in a proper case.
What was considered a proper case was to be determined by the
presiding judge and did not require a new set of facts or a change of
conditions. Orders that were immediately reviewable-orders made
as a matter of law that affected a substantial right-could not be
reconsidered unless there was a new set of facts or a change of
conditions (although in such cases it is less accurate to say that
reconsideration is allowed because the new facts or changed
conditions also render the issue "new" and the consideration of the
66. See Glenn, supra note 5, at 17 (stating that the rule that "one federal judge cannot
properly overrule the decision or order of another federal district judge in the same case"
is more properly expressed as the rule that "a judge should not overrule or reconsider the
previous decision or order of another judge") (emphasis added).
67. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 618 (1983) ("Law of the case directs a
court's discretion, it does not limit the tribunal's power."); Steinman, supra note 5, at 597
(stating that law of the case principles are "best understood as rules of sensible and sound
practice that permit logical progression towards judgment, but that do not disable a court
from altering prior interlocutory decisions in a case").
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issue de novo). It was the immediate reviewability that was the
crucial factor in the law of reconsideration. By the early 1970s, the
case law had not established a functional rule to determine which
interlocutory orders affected a substantial right and were therefore
immediately reviewable, but the cases had established that certain
interlocutory orders were immediately reviewable. According to the
rules and case law, grants or denials of motions to strike were
immediately reviewable. 68 Discretionary denials of motions to amend
were not. This was the state of the law of reconsideration when the
procedurally complicated case of Calloway v. Motor Co. 69 made its
way into the courts of North Carolina.
II. CALLOWAY V. MOTOR Co.
A. In the Superior Court
In Calloway, a police officer who was injured in an automobile
accident while on duty sued the manufacturer, Ford Motor Company,
and the seller, Matthews Motors, Inc., for defective installation and
inspection of seatbelts.70 Neither defendant pled the statute of
limitations in its answer. Approximately seventeen months after
filing its answer, defendant Matthews moved for permission to amend
its answer to allege the three-year statute of limitations. Superior
court Judge Hasty denied the motion.71 Several days later defendant
Ford filed its amended answer alleging the statute of limitations. No
order permitting Ford to file this answer was found in the record, but
Ford's amended answer stated that it was filed "by leave of Court
granted by the Honorable Fred H. Hasty."'72 Six days after Ford filed
its amended answer, Matthews filed an amended answer which
alleged the statute of limitations but, like Ford's amended answer,
was "supported by no order in the record."'73 The plaintiff moved to
68. During 1970, when the trial court entered the interlocutory orders in question in
Calloway, Rule 4 of both the Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court of North Carolina
and the Rules of Practice in the Court of Appeals of North Carolina allowed a party who
conceived prejudice from an order striking or denying a motion to strike allegations in
pleadings, or an order overruling most demurrers, to petition the Court for a writ of
certiorari. See N.C. SuP. CF. R. PRACr. 4 (1974 Cum. Supp.) (remaining in effect until
July 1, 1975); N.C. CT. APP. R. PRAcr. 4 (1970 & 1971 Cum. Supp.) (remaining in effect
until January 20, 1971).
69. 281 N.C. 496,189 S.E.2d 484 (1972).
70. See id. at 497,189 S.E.2d at 486.
71. See id. at 498,189 S.E.2d at 486.
72. Id. Initially the plaintiff took no action in response to Ford's filing an amended
answer without first securing the court's permission. See discussion infra note 77.
73. 281 N.C. at 499, 189 S.E.2d at 487.
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strike Matthews's amended answer on the ground that Judge Hasty
had denied the company's motion to amend. This motion was
granted by Judge Fate J. Beal, who apparently had rotated into the
district to hold a session of court.74
Several months later, defendant Matthews again moved for
permission to amend its answer to allege the statute of limitations.
Matthews based its motion on Ford's asserting this defense and noted
that the court's allowing Matthews "to enter the same plea would be
just and equitable."'75 Two days later Ford moved for summary
judgment on the statute of limitations issue, and two weeks later the
plaintiff moved to strike Ford's amended answer on the grounds that
it had been filed without the court's permission.76 A third superior
74. Judge Beal's decision appeared only in the form of an undated handwritten
notation in the margin of plaintiff's motion: "Motion ruled on and language deleted as
marked on lines 5 and 6 of page 5 of amended answer. Fate J. Beal, Judge Presiding."
The supreme court noted that "[t]his informal and confusing method of ruling upon a
motion is expressly disapproved." Calloway, 281 N.C. at 499, 189 S.E.2d at 487. Judge
Beal's ruling was even more confusing than the court noted. Plaintiff's motion had been
to dismiss Matthews's amended answer in its entirety because no permission to file had
been obtained. Judge Beal's ruling allowed the amended answer to stand with three
further defenses not contained in the original answer, but the judge struck one
parenthetical phrase contained in the third further defense that raised the statute of
limitations issue. By not striking the entire amended answer, the judge's grant of
plaintiff's motion to dismiss could be viewed as implying either (1) a partial grant of an
implied motion to amend by defendant, or (2) a grant of an implied motion to amend by
defendant, followed by a partial grant of a motion to strike by plaintiff. See Calloway v.
Ford Motor Co., 11 N.C. App. 511, 514-15, 181 S.E.2d 764, 766 (1971) (Brock, J.,
dissenting) ("[P]laintiff filed a motion to dismiss the amended answer of Matthews Motors
upon the grounds that leave to amend had been denied by Judge Hasty. [Only] the
portion of the amended answer of Matthews Motors which pleaded the statute of
limitations was stricken [by Judge Fate J. Beal]."), rev'd, 281 N.C. 496, 189 S.E.2d 484
(1972). In this sense, then, Calloway involved orders both on motions to amend and to
strike. Further subtleties would have arisen had Judge Beal's simple notation been
entered the prior summer, before North Carolina abolished the demurrer. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 1A-1, Rule 7(c) (1969). Judge Beal's strike of the defendant's entire plea would
have been immediately appealable as a sustained demurrer, rather than immediately
reviewable as a grant of a motion to strike. See Cecil v. High Point, 266 N.C. 728, 730, 147
S.E.2d 223, 225 (1966) (stating that orders on motions to strike portions of a complaint
were immediately reviewable by certiorari only, while orders on motions to strike an
entire plea in bar were immediately appealable as sustained demurrers).
75. Calloway, 281 N.C. at 500, 189 S.E.2d at 500. One of Matthews's defenses was
that Ford's negligence was primary and active while Matthews's negligence, if any, was
passive and secondary. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 499, 189 S.E.2d at 487. Matthews thus
also argued that it was entitled to indemnity from Ford in the event that Matthews was
found liable.
76. The unequal treatment of Ford and Matthews seems to be the crux of the matter
in Calloway, but the Calloway opinion never resolves the issue nor does it divulge
precisely how the issue fits into its analysis or decision. Calloway does note that the
plaintiff initially gave notice of appeal of the summary judgment in favor of Ford but that
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court judge, Judge Ervin, denied the plaintiff's motion to strike,77
granted Ford's motion for summary judgment, and, several days later,
declined to consider Matthews's motion to amend its answer to plead
the statute of limitations. Judge Ervin's order recited that he was
"inclined to grant this motion of Matthews" but that he lacked "the
authority to exercise his discretion but must rule as a matter of law."'78
Judge Ervin's order mentioned both Judge Hasty's discretionary
denial of Matthews's first motion to amend and Judge Beal's "entry
on the pleadings in this cause," but was not more specific as to the
basis for his ruling.79
the appeal was subsequently withdrawn. See id. at 500, 189 S.E.2d at 487.
77. The record in Calloway reveals an issue that may have been of significance in this
case but that was not directly addressed in the appellate opinions. The plaintiff did not file
a motion to strike Ford's amended answer of May 8, 1970, which alleged the statute of
limitations defense, until November 5,1970-two weeks after Ford had filed its motion for
summary judgment and over five months after plaintiff had moved to strike Matthews's
amended complaint. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 500, 189 S.E.2d at 487. In the November 6,
1970 motion, the plaintiff explained that the plaintiff had not bothered to read Ford's
amended answer because Ford's attorney had, at the time he filed the amended answer,
told plaintiff that the amended answer did not contain "any new matters except to plead
the negligence of the City of Asheville." Motion (Filed November 5, 1970), BRIEFS &
RECORDS, SPRING TERM 1972, No. 64, at 47. On this basis the plaintiff apparently
acquiesced in Ford's filing its amended answer without first obtaining court approval. This
may have been the basis for Judge Ervin's November 5, 1970 denial of the plaintiff's
motion to strike Ford's amended answer on the grounds that Ford never had the court's
permission to amend its answer. Interestingly, the supreme court apparently interpreted
Judge Ervin's denial of the plaintiff's motion to strike Ford's amended answer as a grant
of Ford's implied motion to amend. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 505, 189 S.E.2d at 490
("[T]hereafter, on 5 November 1980, Judge Ervin permitted Ford to plead the statute by
refusing to strike the amended answer which Ford had filed without permission.").
78. Calloway, 281 N.C. at 500, 189 S.E.2d at 487.
79. Id. Judge Hasty's interlocutory ruling denying Matthews's motion to amend was
not immediately appealable and so was subject to reconsideration by Judge Ervin if Judge
Ervin deemed it a proper case for such reconsideration. Judge Beal's interlocutory ruling
granting plaintiff's motion to strike Matthews's amended answer, however, did affect a
substantial right and was immediately appealable. As explained supra note 74, however,
Judge Beal's ruling could be read as merely a partial grant of Matthews's implied motion
to amend its answer. Judge Ervin may have viewed Matthews's acquiescence as rendering
Judge Ervin without authority to overrule Judge Beal absent a change of circumstance.
Judge Beal's order was more than simply an acknowledgment that Matthews had never
been granted the authority to amend its answer as it had alleged in its amended answer. If
Judge Beal's ruling was in reality a reconsideration of Matthews's motion to amend,
however, then perhaps it was not properly subject to immediate appeal and the rule of
imputed law of the case.
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B. On Appeal to the North Carolina Court of Appeals
The court of appeals granted Matthews's motion for certiorari 0
to review Judge Ervin's refusal to consider the renewed motion."' A
two-judge majority of the court of appeals affirmed Judge Ervin's
order,'2 but admitted no distinction, or significance of any such
distinction, between interlocutory orders that were immediately
reviewable and those that were not. Apparently, the majority did not
consider the case law which held that grants or denials of motions to
strike might affect a substantial right and be immediately reviewable,
nor did they consider that the rule that no appeal lies from one
superior court judge to another has no application to mere
interlocutory orders. The majority upheld Judge Ervin, explaining
80. It appears that Matthews initially treated Judge Ervin's interlocutory order as
though it were immediately appealable. The court of appeals stated that when the case
was called for oral argument Matthews moved that its appeal be treated as a petition for
certiorari, and the petition "as a substitute for an appeal" was allowed. See Calloway v.
Ford Motor Co., 11 N.C. App. 511, 513, 181 S.E.2d 764, 765 (1971), rev'd, 281 N.C. 496,
189 S.E.2d 484 (1972). Evidently, Matthews ultimately concluded that Judge Ervin's
interlocutory ruling as a matter of law that he lacked authority to consider defendant's
motion was not immediately appealable. The court of appeals's decision to treat the
appeal as a petition for certiorari may indicate an agreement with this conclusion-or a
lack of awareness of the issue. In reality, the refusal of a court to exercise its discretion
due to perceived want of power may have been immediately appealable. See, e.g., State
Hwy. Comm. v. Hemphill, 269 N.C. 535,537, 153 S.E.2d 22,25 (1967) ("But if the exercise
of a discretionary power of the Superior Court is refused upon the ground that it has no
power to grant a motion addressed to its discretion, the ruling of the court is reviewable.");
Tickle v. Hobgood, 212 N.C. 762, 763, 194 S.E. 461, 461-62 (1938) ("Where ... the court
denies [a motion for a bill of particulars or to require a pleading to be made more definite
and certain] as a matter of law, without the exercise of discretion, the defendant is entitled
to have the application reconsidered and passed upon as a discretionary matter."); Welch
v. Kingsland, 89 N.C. 179, 180-81 (1883) (holding that the trial court's refusal, on grounds
of want of power, to strike and vacate a prior order was immediately appealable); Merrill
v. Merrill, 92 N.C. 657, 659 (1885) (noting that the question of whether or not the court
had the discretionary power to introduce a new party plaintiff was immediately
appealable); McKinnon v. Faulk, 68 N.C. 279, 280 (1873) (stating in dicta while
entertaining an immediate appeal of an order allowing an amendment to the pleadings
that "[w]hen [superior court judges] make or refuse to make amendments, under a mistake
as to their power, this Court will review their action. . . .") (emphasis added).
81. See Calloway, 11 N.C. App. at 513, 181 S.E.2d at 765. The opinion of the supreme
court later makes clear that Matthews appealed from both Judge Ervin's denial of the
renewed motion for want of power and from the initial denial of its motion to amend by
Judge Hasty.
82. The court of appeals's majority chose to ignore the significance of Judge Beal's
grant of the motion to dismiss on Judge Ervin's decision, which also appeared in substance
to be both the grant of a motion to amend and to strike. See supra note 74. The majority
opinion of the court of appeals did not mention Judge Beal's order; indeed, even when
quoting Judge Ervin's order, the opinion included the reference to Judge Hasty's order,
while omitting all reference to Judge Beal's order.
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that if Matthews "felt that Judge Hasty's order denying its motion to
amend was erroneous, then relief should have been sought through
the appellate courts," instead of refiling the same motion before
Judge Ervin.'
To support this proposition the majority relied on three cases,
Greene v. Laboratories, Inc.,' In re Register,' and Bank v. Hanner,6
along with the "well settled principle of law that no appeal lies from
one superior court judge to another." T None of the cases cited,
however, stand for the proposition that the denial of a motion to
amend affects a substantial right and is thus immediately appealable,
nor do they contradict the rule, as stated in Bland v. Faulkner,8 that
the "principle that no appeal lies from one judge of the Superior
Court to another ... has no application to a mere interlocutory
order."8 9 Greene and Hanner involved rulings on motions to strike
where immediate review of the rulings was not pursued; successor
judges were without authority to reconsider such orders because of
acquiescence or imputed law of the case. In re Register was a final
judgment case-not an interlocutory order case-where the party's
failure to perfect the appeal from the final judgment rendered the
judgment law of the case. In stating the basis for its ruling in
Calloway, the court of appeals' majority appears to have
misunderstood the cases and misapplied the rule.
Judge Brock dissented from the majority opinion but without
directly challenging the majority's analysis.' Judge Brock was
bothered by the unfairness of allowing one co-defendant to amend its
answer to plead the running of the statute of limitations while
83. Calloway, 11 N.C. App. at 513, 181 S.E.2d at 766. It should be noted that in the
supreme court's Calloway opinion, the court stated that Matthews had appealed Judge
Hasty's order to the court of appeals and that the court of appeals had affirmed Judge
Hasty's order. The supreme court's opinion stated that Matthews's appeal to the court of
appeals assigned error to both Judge Hasty's and Judge Ervin's orders and that the court
of appeals "affirmed the orders of the Superior Court." Calloway v. Motor Co., 281 N.C.
496,500, 189 S.E.2d 484,487 (1972) (emphasis added). The supreme court then appeared
to affirm the court of appeals in this regard by stating that it was clear that "at the time
Judge Hasty denied Matthews's motion to amend, there was no basis for any contention
that he had abused his discretion." Calloway, 281 N.C. at 500-501, 189 S.E.2d at 488.
84. 254 N.C. 680,120 S.E.2d 82 (1961).
85. 5 N.C. App. 29,167 S.E.2d 802 (1969).
86. 268 N.C. 668, 151 S.E.2d 579 (1966).
87. Calloway, 281 N.C. at 501, 189 S.E.2d at 498.
88. Bland v. Faulkner, 194 N.C. 427,139 S.E. 835 (1927).
89. Id. at 429, 139 S.E. at 836.
90. In his dissent, Judge Brock began by stating: "The straight line approach of the
majority opinion in this case brings forth principles of law with which I have no quarrel
.... " Calloway, 11 N.C. App. at 514,181 S.E.2d at 766 (Brock, J., dissenting).
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denying the same privilege to the other co-defendant. While he,
unlike the majority, acknowledged the existence of Judge Beal's
order, Judge Brock, too, ignored the possibility that it was the
immediate reviewability of Judge Beal's ruling that may have
deprived Judge Ervin of authority to reconsider. Judge Brock stated
only that Judge Ervin clearly "felt" that both Judge Hasty's and
Judge Beal's orders "were binding upon him as a matter of law."91
Thus Judge Brock did not challenge the majority's apparent
claim that as a general rule a successor judge lacks authority to
reconsider an interlocutory order previously entered, but instead
focused on the equities of the case, remarking that "circumstances
had so changed since the entry of Judge Hasty's order and the entry
of Judge Beal's order that Judge Ervin was authorized to act in his
discretion to meet the exigencies of the case."g  To support this
statement Judge Brock then quoted the rule that "[i]nterlocutory
judgments or orders are under the control of the court and may be
corrected or changed at any time before final judgment to meet the
exigencies of the case. '93 Describing the equities (or exigencies) of
the case as "changed circumstances" was, however, both an
unnecessary gloss on the true test-changed circumstances is arguably
a higher standard than exigencies of the case-and an inaccurate
portrayal of the facts of Calloway. In fact, Judge Hasty apparently
had the discretionary authority to deny Matthews's motion to amend
and to grant Ford's motion to amend.94 Once these decisions had
been made, the consequences that would flow from such decisions
were arguably not changed circumstances. If Judge Hasty allowed
Ford to amend its answer to allege the statute of limitations, the fact
that Ford would subsequently amend its answer to allege the statute
of limitations and ultimately move for and be granted summary
judgment on the statute of limitations issue is rather predictable and
91. Id. at 515, 181 S.E.2d at 767 (Brock, J., dissenting). Judge Beal's order was
probably binding on Judge Ervin as a matter of law because rulings on motions to strike
were immediately reviewable and so subject to imputed law of the case. Yet, if Judge
Beal's decision is read as resolving only the issue of whether Matthews could file an
amended answer without the permission of the court, then even if binding on Judge Ervin,
it would not have conflicted with any decision Judge Ervin made with regard to the
substance of the new motion seeking authority to amend.
92. Id. (Brock, J., dissenting).
93. Id. (Brock, J., dissenting).
94. The supreme court found no abuse of discretion in Judge Hasty denying
Matthews's motion to amend, even in light of the fact that Judge Hasty may have allowed
Ford's identical motion to amend. See supra note 83. If this was not an abuse of
discretion, then it is doubtful that the clear and direct consequences of Judge Hasty's
order could constitute new facts or circumstances.
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not a surprise or a change of circumstances. Nevertheless, Judge
Brock implied that it was this change of circumstance that somehow
restored to Judge Ervin the authority to reconsider Matthews's
motion to amend its answer.95 Because of the dissent, Matthews was
able to appeal the decision to the supreme court as a matter of right. 6
C. On Appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court
In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court provided
substantially more analysis of the reconsideration issue than was
found in the court of appeals's three-paragraph, three-case-cite
opinion. The supreme court's opinion included citation to North
Carolina Index, Corpus Juris Secundum, American Jurisprudence,
American Law Reports, and fourteen North Carolina Supreme Court
cases. Despite its apparent consideration of other relevant resources,
the supreme court essentially adopted the mistaken analysis of both
the court of appeals's majority and dissent. The cases cited by the
supreme court in Calloway are arguably all final judgment,
immediately appealable interlocutory order, or acquiescence cases-
cases that would allow reconsideration of mere interlocutory orders
but that deny reconsideration when there has been a final judgment,
when the interlocutory order affected a substantial right and so was
immediately appealable, or when the interlocutory order was
immediately reviewable but such right to review was not exercised.
These cases do not support the propositions for which they are cited
in Calloway.
1. Calloway's Flawed Rationale
Calloway began by noting that Judge Hasty's denial of
Matthews's first motion to amend was not an abuse of discretion
because Matthews had waited almost a year and a half after its
answer had been filed to make its- motion to amend.97 The court
apparently was affirming the court of appeals on this point.98 The
court then stated the issue before it as "whether Judge Ervin, in his
discretion, had authority to permit an amendment which Judge Hasty,
in his discretion, had denied earlier." 99 This statement of the issue
ignored the impact, if any, of Judge Beal's " 'entry on the pleadings in
95. See Calloway, 11 N.C. App. at 515, 181 S.E.2d at 767 (Brock, J., dissenting).
96. An appeal lies of right from any decision of the court of appeals in which there is a
dissent. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-30 (1999).
97. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 501, 189 S.E.2d at 488.
98. See supra note 83.
99. Calloway, 281 N.C. at 501, 189 S.E.2d at 488.
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this cause,' "100 which was expressly referenced in Judge Ervin's order
concluding that he lacked authority to exercise his discretion in a
renewed motion to amend. Consideration of the effect of Judge
Beal's order-and whether Judge Beal's order was the grant of a
motion to strike or a motion to amend-would have raised the
significance of immediate reviewability to the law of reconsideration.
The Calloway court then cited North Carolina Index for the "well
established" rules that no appeal lies from one judge to another, that
one judge may not correct another's errors of law,101 and that one
judge may ordinarily not modify, overrule or change the judgment of
another judge.1'1 This set of rules has been cited numerous times by
subsequent cases to deny the authority to reconsider mere
interlocutory orders.' ° The cases cited by North Carolina Index that
established these rules, however, involve final judgments or
immediately reviewable interlocutory orders.1 4 They do not involve
100. Id. at 500,189 S.E.2d at 487 (quoting the order of the trial judge).
101. The section of North Carolina Index cited by Calloway, 2 NORTH CAROLINA
INDEX 2D Courts § 9 (1967), does not contain the language that the opinion attributes to
it: "that one Superior Court judge may not correct another's errors of law." Although
four cases cited in North Carolina Index contain similar language, see In re Burton, 257
N.C. 534, 541, 126 S.E.2d 581, 586 (1962) ("But one superior court judge may not modify,
reverse or set aside a judgment of another superior court judge as being erroneous.");
Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N.C. 712, 714, 6 S.E.2d 497, 498 (1940) (stating that errors of
law in a final judgment could be remedied by appeal only); Price v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of
Tenn., Inc., 201 N.C. 376, 377, 160 S.E. 367, 368 (1931) (holding that the court could not
reverse as matter of law its ruling on evidence where a verdict was returned and judgment
given); Wellons v. Lassiter, 200 N.C. 474, 477-78, 157 S.E. 434, 436 (1931) (holding that a
final judgment may not be set aside at a subsequent term for error of law), none suggest
the restriction applies to orders infieri.
102. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 501,189 S.E.2d at 488.
103. See North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Virginia Carolina Builders, 307 N.C. 563, 566,
299 S.E.2d 629, 631 (1983); Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line v. Calco Enter., 132 N.C. App.
237, 241, 511 S.E.2d 671, 674-75 (1999); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 132 N.C. App. 82, 88, 510
S.E.2d 178, 181, rev'd on other grounds, 350 N.C. 590, 516 S.E.2d 381 (1999); McArdle
Corp. v. Patterson, 115 N.C. App. 528, 531-32, 445 S.E.2d 604, 606-07 (1994); Dublin v.
UCR, Inc., 115 N.C. App. 209,219, 444 S.E.2d 455, 461 (1994); Madry v. Madry, 106 N.C.
App. 34, 37-38, 415 S.E.2d 74, 77 (1992); Whitley's Elec. Serv., Inc. v. Walston, 105 N.C.
App. 609, 610, 414 S.E.2d 47, 47-48 (1992); Smithwick v. Crutchfield, 87 N.C. App. 374,
376, 361 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1987); Trydin Indus., Inc. v. American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 46
N.C. App. 91, 93,264 S.E.2d 357, 359 (1980); Biddix v. Kellar Constr. Corp., 32 N.C. App.
120,124,230 S.E.2d 796,799 (1977).
104. All of the cases cited in North Carolina Index deal with final judgments and
immediately reviewable interlocutory orders. See Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Hanner, 268
N.C. 668, 670-71, 151 S.E.2d 579, 580-81 (1966) (applying the prohibition on coordinate
appeal where the initial order was an immediately reviewable grant of a motion to strike);
In re Burton, 257 N.C. 534,540-41,126 S.E.2d 581,586 (1962) (noting that a habeas corpus
proceeding is not a substitute for appeal); Cuthbertson v. Burton, 251 N.C. 457, 459, 111
S.E.2d 604, 605-06 (1959) (involving a compromise approved by the court treated as a
final judgment); Davis v. Jenkins, 239 N.C. 533, 534, 80 S.E.2d 257, 258 (1954) (stating that
1826 [Vol. 78
RECONSIDERATION
reconsideration of mere interlocutory orders. The rules cited by
Calloway were indeed "well-established." They simply were not
applicable to interlocutory orders that were not immediately
reviewable, and they did not alter the rule stated in Bland that "[t]he
principle that no appeal lies from one judge ... to another .. has no
application to a mere interlocutory order." °5
The court next cited American Jurisprudence for the proposition
that the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to interlocutory
decisions with the "same strictness" as to judgments,0 6 and then cited
Temple v. Western Union Telegraph,1°7 as well as North Carolina
Index, for the proposition that the doctrine does not apply unless the
order involves a substantial right 0 8 This "same strictness" concept
was first alluded to in North Carolina law in a case pertinent to the
law of reconsideration, Mabry v. Henry.0 9 Mabry held that "the
principle of res adjudicata does not extend to ordinary motions
incidental to the progress of a cause, for what may one day be refused
may the next be granted, but it does apply to decisions affecting a
substantial right subject to review in an appellate court."" 0 By
an unappealed judgment may not be modified by another trial judge); Hall v. Shippers
Express, Inc., 234 N.C. 38, 40, 65 S.E.2d 333, 335 (1951) (noting that the court has the right
to retain jurisdiction until the end of the litigation); In re Adams, 218 N.C. 379, 381, 11
S.E.2d 163, 165 (1940) (noting that a habeas corpus proceeding is not a substitute for an
appeal); Cameron v. McDonald, 216 N.C. 712, 714, 6 S.E.2d 497, 498 (1940) (noting that
after final judgment the remedy for errors of law is by appeal only); Dail v. Hawkins, 211
N.C. 283, 283, 189 S.E. 774, 774 (1937) (noting that an order of abatement is final and
correctable for error only on appeal, where it is not an irregular judgment); East Coast
Fertilizer Co., Inc. v. Hardee, 211 N.C. 56, 58, 188 S.E. 623, 624 (1936) (stating that an
order immediately reviewable as affecting substantial right may not be reconsidered);
Edwards v. Perry, 206 N.C. 474,475, 174 S.E. 285,285 (1934) (holding that a consent order
could not be stricken ex mero motu); Price v. Life & Cas. Ins. Co. of Tenn., Inc., 201 N.C.
376, 377, 160 S.E. 367, 368 (1931) (holding that the court could not reverse as a matter of
law its ruling on evidence where a verdict had been returned and judgment given);
Wellons v. Lassiter, 200 N.C. 474, 477-78, 157 S.E. 434, 436 (1931) (stating that a final
judgment may not be set aside at a subsequent term for error of law). North Carolina
Index also lists two cases dealing with child custody, an area of law which is a well-
acknowledged exception to the plenary power of the court to reconsider on the same facts.
See Stanback v. Stanback, 266 N.C. 72, 75-76, 145 S.E.2d 332, 334-35 (1965) (asserting that
no review is allowed of a custody order without a showing of new facts); Neighbors v.
Neighbors, 236 N.C. 531,532-33,73 S.E.2d 153, 154 (1952) (stating that a custody award is
modifiable on changed circumstances).
105. Bland v. Faulkner, 194 N.C. 427,429,139 S.E. 835,836 (1927).
106. Calloway, 281 N.C. at 501-02, 189 S.E.2d at 488 (citing 56 AM. JUR. 2D Motions,
Rules and Orders § 30 (1971)).
107. 205 N.C. 441,171 S.E.2d 630 (1933).
108. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 502, 189 S.E.2d at 488 (citing 5 NORTH CARoLINA
INDEX 2D Judgments § 37 (1968)).
109. 83 N.C. 298 (1880).
110. Mabry, 83 N.C. at 301 (citing FREEMAN, supra note 25, § 325, at 347, 349-50).
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recognizing the "same strictness" concept, Calloway invoked Mabry
and acknowledged the traditional rule followed in North Carolina
that a trial court may reconsider an interlocutory order in a proper
case.
111
Notwithstanding this direct nod to the traditional rule, Calloway
proceeded to misstate the rule by conditioning a different judge's
authority to reconsider an interlocutory order on "a showing of
changed conditions which warrant such action.""12 While admittedly
changed conditions would be sufficient to justify reconsideration of
any interlocutory order, because the court would not actually be
reconsidering the initial order if conditions had sufficiently changed,
changed conditions had not been required for reconsideration of
mere interlocutory orders, such as the typical motion to amend a
pleading."3 Calloway's misstatement of the rule amounts to treating
all interlocutory orders alike, even after the court had just
acknowledged a significant distinction between interlocutory orders
entered in the court's discretion, as a matter of law, and as a matter of
law affecting a substantial right."
4
Although Mabry does not mention the "same strictness" concept directly, Freeman says
that res judicata "is in general said not to be strictly applicable to motions," and notes that
the" 'doctrine of res adjudicata, in its strict sense, does not apply to such motions made in
the course of practice, and the court may, upon a proper showing, allow a renewal of a
motion of this kind once decided.'" FREEMAN, supra note 25, § 326, at 351 n.1 (quoting
Forde v. Doyle, 44 Cal. 635, 637 (1872)).
111. As noted earlier in this Article, a proper case for reconsideration of a mere
interlocutory order arises to correct an order based on a misapprehension of then existing
law (and presumably also to correct an order based on a misapplication of then existing
law to then existing fact). See supra note 26 (quoting BLACK, supra note 25, § 86, at 280,
281). Some cases do seem to hold that the trial court may not reconsider a matter of law
once decided. See, e.g., Nowell v. Neal, 249 N.C. 516, 521, 107 S.E.2d 107, 110 (1959)
("The proper method for obtaining relief from legal errors is by appeal, G.S. 1-277, and
not by application to another Superior Court. 'In such cases, a judgment entered by one
judge of the Superior Court may not be modified, reversed or set aside by another
Superior Court judge.' ") (quoting Davis v. Jenkins, 239 N.C. 533, 534, 80 S.E.2d 257, 258
(1954); citing Rawls v. Mayo, 163 N.C. 177, 180, 79 S.E. 298, 299 (1913)). As discussed
supra note 101, the rule announced in these cases does not extend to orders in fieri. But
see infra note 151 (discussing Burrell v. Transfer Co., 244 N.C. 662, 94 S.E.2d 829 (1956)).
112. Calloway, 281 N.C. at 502, 189 S.E.2d at 488.
113. In the rare case when injustice may be so manifest as to overcome the policy
behind imputed law of the case, changed conditions may not be absolutely necessary for
reconsideration of orders involving a substantial right. In other words, that which can
overcome traditional law of the case can overcome what we have called "imputed law of
the case." See, e.g., 4 C.J. Appeal and Error § 3078, at 1099 & n.11 (1914) ("Under some
circumstances, however, ... an appellate court will review and reverse its former decision
in the same case, more especially where it is satisfied that gross or manifest injustice has
been done by its former decision .... " (citing Buncombe County Sch. Dir. v. City of
Asheville, 137 N.C. 503,50 S.E. 279 (1905))).
114. In its previous sentence, the court had cited Temple v. Western Union Telegraph
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The chief case cited by Calloway in support of its novel
interpretation of the rule is Miller v. Justice.15  In Miller,
reconsideration was based on subsequent facts showing that an order
of accounting had become unjust,"6 and thus Miller did not modify
the traditional rule. Calloway also claimed support from Bland v.
Faulkner."7 Far from supporting Calloway's position, however,
Bland is the leading case for the rule that a mere interlocutory order
may be modified due to a misapprehension of law then existing raised
ex mero motu by a successor judge under North Carolina's system of
rotation."8 Miller and Bland simply do not stand for the proposition
for which Calloway cited them."9
Having abandoned the traditional rule in favor of a new rule that
ratchets up the showing necessary for reconsideration of interlocutory
orders from a "proper case" to "changed conditions,' 2 ° the court in
Calloway then sought to justify its conclusion by observing that orders
on motions to amend should be treated analogously to orders on
motions to strike.' This argument, which is the heart of the rationale
Co., 205 N.C. 441, 171 S.E. 630 (1933), to help distinguish the class of orders made as a
matter of law affecting a substantial right from the class of orders to which the doctrine of
res judicata does not apply strictly. Temple is also important, however, for dictum that
contemplates the substitution of later discretion for an earlier exercise of discretion on
substantially similar facts. Temple is therefore wholly in line with the tradition that
changed conditions are not necessary to show a proper case for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order. Regarding when a court should reconsider discretionary orders, the
Temple court stated that:
"[it is a matter for the sound discretion of the court whether under the
circumstances of the case a demand for a bill of particulars should be granted or
refused. This power of the court exists by virtue of its general power to regulate
the conduct of trials, and it is incident to its general authority in the
administration of justice. It is the same power in kind that courts have to grant a
new trial on the ground of surprise."
Id at 442,171 S.E.2d at 630 (quoting 49 CJ. Pleading § 887, at 625-26 (1930)).
115. 86 N.C. 26 (1882).
116. See id. at 30.
117. 194 N.C. 427, 139 S.E. 835 (1927).
118. See id. at 429,139 S.E. at 836.
119. A third case cited by Calloway, Rutherford College, Inc. v. Payne, 209 N.C. 792,
184 S.E. 827 (1936), also confirmed the adequacy of subsequent facts as one basis to justify
a renewed motion. Rutherford involved an appeal to the superior court from the clerk of
superior court's findings of fact and order denying defendant's motion for removal. See id.
at 796, 184 S.E. at 829-30. Arguably, Rutherford is an instance of traditional law of the
case, which, as discussed earlier in this Article, may be overcome rarely for manifest
injustice, but which may be avoided on a showing of subsequent facts or parties.
120. As discussed supra note 65, the requirement of changed conditions means that no
reconsideration is allowed but that a similar motion may be filed where conditions are so
different that the ruling on the initial motion cannot be said to be overruled.
121. The structure of the court's argument is (1) both grants and denials of motions to
strike irrelevant, improper, or prejudicial material from pleadings are rulings made as a
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in Calloway, suggests that all orders on pleadings,12 whether
immediately reviewable or not, should be treated similarly. In this
way, the court reiterated its reduction of the traditional rule of the
law of reconsideration of interlocutory orders to the traditional
corollary that a renewed motion may be considered on changed
conditions. Rather than recognizing an inherent, discretionary power
in the trial court to reconsider interlocutory orders not subject to
immediate review, Calloway flatly denied the power to reconsider on
substantially similar facts, at least insofar as orders on pleadings were
at issue. A trial judge could not reconsider a denial of a motion to
amend, just as he could not reconsider immediately reviewable orders
on motions to strike or demur, unless there were changed conditions
that distinguished sufficiently the renewal from the legal issue
underlying the prior order.' 3
matter of law involving no discretion which finally determine the rights of the parties; (2)
likewise, discretionary grants of certain motions to amend may not be modified; (3) cases
that seem to allow the reconsideration of discretionary denials of motions to amend
should be explained as supervisory jurisdiction cases; (4) therefore discretionary denials of
motions to amend, like these other orders on pleadings, may not be modified on
substantially similar facts. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 502-05, 189 S.E.2d at 489-90.
122. The argument presented in the rationale of the case does not solely cite cases
where orders on motions to amend were at issue, although that is its focus. At least it can
be said that the court stays within the confines of cases where orders on pleadings were in
controversy. In its rationale, the court cites cases of grants and denials of motions to
strike, see Calloway, 281 N.C. at 502, 189 S.E.2d at 489 (citing Greene v. Charlotte Chem.
Lab., Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961); Wall v. England, 243 N.C. 36, 89 S.E.2d 785
(1955); Scottish Bank v. Daniel, 218 N.C. at 713, 12 S.E.2d at 226 (1940)), a grant of a
motion to amend, see id- (citing Hardin v. Greene, 164 N.C. 99, 80 S.E. 413 (1913)), a grant
of a motion to amend following sustained demurrer, see icL (citing State v. Standard Oil
Co., 205 N.C. 123, 170 S.E. 134 (1933)), a grant of a motion to amend following mistrial,
see id. (citing Dockery v. Fairbanks, 172 N.C. 529, 90 S.E. 501 (1916)), denials of motions
to amend, see id. at 503-04, 189 S.E.2d at 489-90 (citing Dixie Fire & Cas. Co. v. Esso
Standard Oil Co., 265 N.C. 121, 143 S.E.2d 279 (1965); Overton v. Overton, 259 N.C. 31,
129 S.E.2d 593 (1963); Revis v. Ramsey, 202 N.C. 815, 114 S.E. 358 (1932)), and a denial of
a motion for bill of particulars, see id at 503, 189 S.E.2d at 489 (citing Townsend v.
Williams, 117 N.C. 330,23 S.E. 461 (1895)).
123. This argument by analogy in the rationale of Calloway sheds light on the court's
explicit holding that "when one Superior Court judge, in the exercise of his discretion, has
made an order denying a motion to amend, absent changed conditions, another Superior
Court judge may not thereafter allow the motion," Calloway, 281 N.C. at 505, 189 S.E.2d
at 490, and should be kept in mind when reviewing the court of appeals's characterization
of Calloway, discussed in Section III. As we shall see, the court of appeals will require
changed conditions for the "reconsideration" of discretionary orders, but will deny the
trial judge's right to hear a renewed motion on an order made as a matter of law even if
there were changed conditions. The explicit holding in Calloway does not support the
court of appeals's reading, as it extends only to denials of motions to amend.
Furthermore, the rationale in Calloway depends for its impact on treating immediately
reviewable orders (those made as a matter of law affecting a substantial right) similarly to
discretionary orders. There is no reason to think that Calloway denied the long-standing
2000] RECONSIDERATION 1831
The first step taken by Calloway in this argument was to assert
that both grants and denials of motions to strike irrelevant, improper,
or prejudicial material from pleadings are rulings made as a matter of
law involving no discretion and finally determining the rights of the
parties. 24 Two criticisms must be advanced against this initial
premise, although, in point of fact, the premise was largely true at the
writing of Calloway. First, viewing the motion to strike historically
under the Code of Civil Procedure of North Carolina, it is not clear
that such motion"2 was not directed to the court's discretion. The
statute, as adopted in 1868, stated that "[i]f irrelevant or redundant
matter be inserted in a pleading, it may be stricken out, on motion of
any person aggrieved thereby." 26 The use of the word "may" points
strongly to its discretionary nature.' Various scholarly treatments
have taken the same view." Thus it is arguable that under code
rule that orders made as a matter of law affecting a substantial right could be
"reconsidered" on changed conditions. Finally, the rationale in Calloway might be viewed
as encompassing all other orders made as a matter of law (those not affecting a substantial
right), thus requiring changed conditions for their "reconsideration" too. If not, however,
then the long-standing rule that such orders could be modified even on substantially
similar facts would remain the law, rather than the rule adopted later by the court of
appeals.
124. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 502, 189 S.E.2d at 489.
125. Under the Code of Civil Procedure of North Carolina, sham and irrelevant
answers and defenses could be stricken under section 104 (later codified at CODE OF 1883
§ 247, REVISAL OF 1905 § 472; CONSOLIDATED STATUTES OF NORTH CAROLINA § 510
(1920)), and irrelevant or redundant pleadings could be stricken under section 120 (later
codified at CODE OF 1883 § 496; REVISAL OF 1905 § 261; CONSOLIDATED STATUTES OF
NORTH CAROLINA § 537). See MCINTOSH, supra note 39, § 371, at 378-79 (discussing
irrelevant or redundant allegations). Under the Code, motions to strike were a remedy for
formal defects in pleadings that under the common law had been reached by special
demurrer. See CHARLES T. BOONE, PLEADING UNDER THE CODES §§ 243-244, at 467-
69 (1885).
126. N.C. CODE CIV. P. § 120 (1868) (emphasis added).
127. See, e.g., Townsend v. Williams, 117 N.C. 330, 337, 23 S.E. 461, 463 (1895) ("The
motion for a bill of particulars under The Code, section 259, rests in the discretion of the
presiding Judge, and its grant or refusal is not reviewable. The words of the section are:
'The court may, in all cases, order a bill of particulars.' ") (citation omitted).
128. A scholar writing on the subject of code pleading in the late 19th century, when
North Carolina's law of reconsideration was being thoroughly tested, Charles T. Boone,
who frequently cited both New York and North Carolina law, pointed out that "a motion
to strike out irrelevant or redundant allegations is addressed very much to the discretion
of the court, and should be granted only where it is entirely clear that such matter is
improper or irrelevant." BOONE, supra note 125, § 244, at 468-69; see also CHARLES E.
CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 87, at 552 (1947) ("Since the
pleader should be permitted to state his case in his own way, so long as he fairly states his
case, this power [to strike based on irrelevancy or redundancy] should be used with
reluctance ... and the decision should rest ... in the discretion of the trial judge.")
(citations omitted); MCINTOSH, supra note 39, § 476, at 508 (stating that denials of motion
to strike as sham or frivolous are not immediately appealable) (citing Walters v. Starnes,
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practice motions to strike irrelevant or redundant material from
pleadings and motions to amend pleadings were both addressed to
the discretion of the trial court. Consequently, the retort in Calloway
that "incongruous" treatment of them would be "logically
indefensible" has some basis in the original structure of the code.
But history is not necessarily logically defensible. Fifty years
later, with the enactment of the Consolidated Statutes of North
Carolina, the legislature provided that "[i]f irrelevant or redundant
matter is inserted in a pleading, it may be stricken out on motion of
any person aggrieved thereby, but this motion must be made before
answer or demurrer, or before an extension of time to plead is
granted."12 9  The North Carolina Supreme Court had difficulty
applying this language. For instance, in one case the court argued
that the language must be read as giving the aggrieved party a right
that supports immediate appeal. Otherwise, the court stated, "he gets
nothing which he would not have gotten without making a motion;
whereas, the statute intends to give him something and to give it to
him in time to be of service.""13 When in 1956 the court adopted Rule
4 of its Rules of Practice, which allowed a party to petition
immediately for writ of certiorari concerning orders on motions to
strike, it was clear that these orders were not mere interlocutory
orders addressed to the court's discretion."' Although Calloway
118 N.C. 842, 24 S.E. 713 (1896)). For a more current resource taking a similar
perspective, see MOORE, supra note 11, § 12.37, at 12-93 to 12-99.
129. 1 CONSOLIDATED STATUTES OF NORTH CAROLINA § 537 (1920 & Supp. 1924)
(emphasis added).
130. Hill v. Stansbury, 221 N.C. 339, 342, 20 S.E.2d 308, 309 (1942); see also 1 NORTH
CAROLINA INDEX 2D Appeal & Error § 6, at 119 (1967) (stating that before 1956,
immediate appeal was available from a grant or denial "of a motion to strike matter from
a pleading as a matter of right") (citing, for example, Federal Reserve Bank v. Atmore,
200 N.C. 437, 439,157 S.E. 129, 130-31 (1931) (affirming in an interlocutory appeal, on the
grounds that the order did not affect a substantial right of defendant, a grant of motion to
strike parts of an answer as irrelevant)). By way of contrast, some motions to strike are
addressed to the court's discretion, rather than being made as a matter of right. As noted
in Parrish v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 221 N.C. 292,20 S.E.2d 299 (1942), "[i]f the
motion [to strike] is made after answer or demurrer, or after an extension of time to plead
is granted, then it becomes a matter of the court's discretion, and appeal can only be had
from the final judgment and upon exception duly taken." Id. at 296-97, 20 S.E.2d at 302.
See generally Henry Brandis, Jr. & Willis C. Bumgarner, The Motion to Strike Pleadings in
North Carolina, 29 N.C. L. REv. 3, 21-26 (1950) (cited by Calloway, 281 N.C. at 502, 189
S.E.2d at 489) (concluding that orders on timely motions to strike allegations as irrelevant
are immediately reviewable, while only grants of late-filed motions may be reviewed on an
error standard; that orders on motions to strike for redundancy are treated similarly; that
orders striking scandalous matter are reviewable; and that denials of motions to strike
answers as frivolous are not immediately reviewable).
131. See N.C. SUP. Cr. R. PRACr. 4(a)(2) (1974 Cum. Supp.) (remaining in effect until
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correctly stated that orders on motions to strike material from
pleadings were, in 1972, final rulings made as a matter of law,132 the
court's assertion that logic demands a similar treatment for orders on
motions to amend is questionable. On the contrary, logic arguably
demands that orders on motions to strike material from pleadings be
classified as the discretionary, modifiable orders they had been under
the 1868 code of civil procedure and orders on motions to amend still
were in 1972.133
The second criticism of Calloway's initial premise, the premise
that both grants and denials of motions to strike irrelevant, improper
or prejudicial material from pleadings are rulings made as a matter of
law involving no discretion and finally determining the rights of the
parties, is that the court does not sufficiently stress the reason that
these orders, at least since 1930, "finally determine[] the rights of the
parties.' 134 After 1955, both grants and denials of motions to strike
were immediately reviewable under Rule 4 of the Supreme Court
Rules of Practice. 35  Greene v. Laboratories, Inc.,"6 cited by
July 1, 1975).
132. This assertion is accurate if one is willing to read "final" in the sense of
"supporting immediate review, and therefore unmodifiable at the trial level."
"Appealable interlocutory orders," such as orders on motions to strike, have been
distinguished from "merely interlocutory orders" both in the literature and in the cases;
the former are often described as final in their nature and the latter as formal or technical
in their nature. See, e.g., BLACK, supra note 12, § 29, at 43 (stating that a decision on a
demurrer not entering judgment but allowing to plead over is "merely interlocutory"); id.
§ 32, at 49 (explaining that, under code practice, an order affecting a substantial right is
"final and appealable" and thus "granting or refusing a receiver should be considered as
final for this purpose, since it does not turn upon a formal or technical point"); id. § 36, at
54 (noting that an order dissolving or refusing to dissolve attachments is generally
considered "merely interlocutory," though one state holds that such order is "in its nature
final"); id. § 36, at 54 (suggesting that in most jurisdictions an order quashing execution is
"merely interlocutory [and] not a final judgment").
133. See Biggs v. Moffitt, 218 N.C. 601, 602-03, 11 S.E.2d 870, 871 (1940) (providing a
short survey of amendments as of right and stating that prior to the adoption of the
Revisal of 1905, a pleading could be amended as of course only when done before time for
answering had expired).
134. Calloway, 281 N.C. at 502,189 S.E.2d at 489.
135. See N.C. Sup. Cr. R. PRACr. 4(a)(2) (1974 Cum. Supp.) (remaining in effect until
July 1, 1975).
136. 254 N.C. 680, 120 S.E.2d 82 (1961). In Greene, the trial judge denied the first
defendant's motion to strike paragraphs from the answer of a second defendant. See id. at
693,120 S.E.2d at 91. The first defendant did not except to this order. See id The second
defendant amended its answer, bringing forward paragraphs to which the first defendant
had objected, as well as other paragraphs. See id. The first defendant then moved to
strike the objectionable paragraphs from the second defendant's amended answer, and the
successor judge granted the motion. See id On appeal, the supreme court held that the
successor judge did not have authority to strike the same paragraphs that his predecessor
would not strike, but that the strike would stand nonetheless under the supreme court's
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Calloway, falls into this time period. Greene was reviewed by grant of
certiorari, and held, among other things, that the grant of a motion to
strike by the successor judge was made without authority due to a
denial of the same by his predecessor, although it was allowed to
stand under the court's supervisory jurisdiction.137 Under Greene's
survey of the law of reconsideration, 38 this lack of authority was due
to the acquiescence of the moving party in the immediately
reviewable denial of his motion to strike.3  Calloway also cited two
cases decided before 1956 to support its statement concerning
motions to strike: Wall v. England40 and Scottish Bank v. Daniel.14'
Both grants and denials of motions to strike were immediately
appealable as a matter of practice at the time Wall was decided. 142
supervisory jurisdiction. See id at 694, 120 S.E.2d at 91-92.
137. See id. at 694,120 S.E.2d at 91.
138. See icL at 693-94,120 S.E.2d at 91.
139. The Official Reporter of the opinion was so convinced of this reading that he
included the following headnote in the North Carolina Reports:
17. Pleadings 34: Courts 6-Where one judge of the Superior Court has refused
motion to strike certain allegations from a pleading and no appeal is taken
therefrom, another judge of the Superior Court is without jurisdiction to allow
motion to strike the identical allegation from the amended pleading, since one
Superior Court judge may not modify or change an order of another Superior
Court judge affecting a substantial right.
Greene, 254 N.C. at 682.
140. 243 N.C. 36,89 S.E.2d 785 (1955).
141. 218 N.C. 710,12 S.E.2d 224 (1940).
142. See Garrett v. Rose, 236 N.C. 299,305,72 S.E.2d 843, 847 (1952) (Ervin, J.) ("The
question of the correctness of this ruling is properly before us because an immediate
appeal lies from the granting of a motion to strike out parts of a pleading."); see also 1
NORTH CAROLINA INDEX 2D Appeal & Error § 6, at 119 (1967) (stating that before 1956,
immediate appeal was available from a grant or denial "of a motion to strike matter from
a pleading as a matter of right"). In the decades preceding Wall, the immediate
appealability of denials of motions to strike proved especially difficult to decide. Where a
substantial right was prejudiced, an immediate appeal would be supported. See, e.g., Hill
v. Stansbury, 221 N.C. 339, 341-42, 20 S.E.2d 308, 309 (1942) (stating that the denial of a
motion to strike is immediately appealable if it affects a substantial right); Parrish v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 221 N.C. 292, 296, 20 S.E.2d 299, 302 (1942) (stating that "it may
be that the rationale of this rule is that a substantial right is affected by the denial of a
motion addressed to the right of the question rather than to the court's discretion"); Tar
Heel Hoisery Mill v. Durham Hoisery Mills, 198 N.C. 596, 598, 152 S.E. 794, 795 (1930)
("If, however, an interlocutory order affects a substantial right of a party to the action, and
is prejudicial to such right, he may appeal therefrom to this Court, and his appeal will be
heard, and decided on its merits."). At least one case found a substantial right to be
prejudiced. See Ellis v. Ellis, 198 N.C. 767,768, 153 S.E. 449, 449 (1930) ("The denial of a
motion made in apt time to strike from a complaint irrelevant and redundant matter
affects a substantial right and is appealable. Conversely the granting of such motion is not
such an interlocutory order as to foreclose review by the appellate court."). Where a
substantial right was not prejudiced, an appeal would be dismissed as premature. See, e.g.,
Privette v. Privette, 230 N.C. 52, 52-53, 51 S.E.2d 925, 925-26 (1949) (stating that where
not unduly prejudicial to movant, an order denying a motion to strike was not immediately
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Wall followed this rule, holding that where an order both strikes
material and grants leave to amend, the aggrieved party may not
replead the stricken material verbatim; the initial order striking that
material is "not so much [] res judicata, as the law of the case,"'43 and
the aggrieved party's remedy was to appeal the strike immediately.
144
Daniel is also consistent with the theme that an immediately
appealable interlocutory denial of a motion to strike that has gone
unappealed is binding. 45 Each authority cited by Calloway for the
proposition that orders on motions to strike finally determine the
rights of the parties base this rule not on the fact that the initial ruling
was made as a matter of law, nor on the fact that it was a ruling about
pleadings, but rather on the fact that these rulings were immediately
reviewable as matters of law affecting a substantial right. Because
orders on motions to amend had never been immediately reviewable
under the appeals statute, nor as a matter of practice, nor under
Supreme Court Rule 4, such orders were historically distinguishable
from grants or denials of motions to strike. For this reason, cases
holding that orders on motions to strike were subject to imputed law
of the case, thus requiring changed conditions before a renewed
motion may be considered, did not require identical legal treatment
of orders on motions to amend or of any other order not subject to
imputed law of the case.
Calloway next asserted that a successor judge may not reconsider
appealable); Tar Heel Hoisery Mill, 198 N.C. at 598, 152 S.E. at 795 ("If the order does not
affect a substantial right of the appellant, his appeal therefrom to this Court will be
dismissed."). Examples of cases holding no prejudice to substantial right include
Pemberton v. City of Greensboro, 203 N.C. 514, 515, 166 S.E. 396, 397 (1932) ("As no
substantial right, of which the defendant can apparently complain, has presently been
affected or impaired, the judgment will not be disturbed."), and Tar Heel Hoisery Mill, 198
N.C. at 598, 152 S.E. at 796 ("We are of the opinion that no substantial right of defendant
has been impaired or affected to its prejudice. . .."). See generally Brandis & Bumgarner,
supra note 130, at 21-26 (concluding that orders on timely motions to strike allegations as
irrelevant are immediately reviewable, while only grants of late-filed motions may be
reviewed on an error standard; that orders on motions to strike for redundancy are treated
similarly; that orders striking scandalous matter are reviewable; and that denials of
motions to strike answers as frivolous are not immediately reviewable).
143. Wall, 243 N.C. at 39,89 S.E.2d at 787.
144. See id.
145. See Daniel, 218 N.C. at 713, 12 S.E.2d at 226 ("When judgment was entered
denying the motions of the defendants to strike ..., neither defendant excepted thereto.
Nor did they appeal therefrom. It thereupon became binding upon the defendants. They
could not thereafter appeal to another judge of the Superior Court to review or to reverse
the original order .... "). The interlocutory order appealed from in Daniel was the denial
by the second judge of the renewed motion to strike, and as such it is clear that the court
recognized the right to appeal immediately from the denial of motions to strike.
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a discretionary grant of a motion to amend. 46 The court observed
that "[1]ikewise, when one judge allows a motion to amend a pleading
in his discretion ... a second judge may not strike it on the ground
that the first erred in allowing it. He is 'under the necessity of
observing the terms of the judgment allowing the [party] to
amend.' "147 Calloway cited State v. Standard Oil Co.148 in support of
this proposition. In Standard Oil, the initial order sustained a
demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action and granted leave to amend. The amended complaint restated
the same insufficient facts and was stricken by the succeeding judge,
for had he allowed it he would have in effect overruled as error the
sustained demurrer of his predecessor. 149  As the court stated in
affirming the strike, "[i]t is not open to the plaintiff [in filing the
amended complaint] to say the original complaint does state facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action, for the judgment sustaining
the demurrers, unappealed from, forecloses this position."'5 °
Standard Oil, then, does not stand for the proposition that a
discretionary grant of a motion to amend may not be reconsidered on
substantially similar facts, nor even that a successor judge may not
correct the error of his predecessor who had granted such a motion. 151
146. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 504, 189 S.E.2d at 490 ("[W]hen a judge in his discretion
allows a motion to amend his order binds another Superior Court judge .... "). In
contrast to the conclusion drawn by Calloway, a majority of states seem to have followed
the rule that "[a]n amended or supplemental pleading or count thereof may be stricken
out in a proper case, even after it has been filed by leave of court." 49 C.J. Pleading § 979,
at 689 (1930).
147. Calloway, 281 N.C. at 502, 189 S.E.2d at 489 (quoting State v. Standard Oil Co.,
205 N.C. 123,126, 170 S.E. 134, 135 (1933)).
148. 205 N.C. 123, 170 S.E. 134 (1933).
149. Standard Oil is not a case of one judge overruling another. The exception to the
traditional, plenary power to reconsider was applicable to this case, and the second judge
respected this exception by not allowing a motion that would have in effect overruled an
immediately appealable order in which a party had acquiesced.
150. 205 N.C. at 127,170 S.E. at 135 (citations omitted).
151. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Don Allen Chevrolet Co., 253 N.C. 243, 116 S.E.2d 780
(1960), arguably raised the same issue as Standard Oil, though Justice Bobbitt, writing for
the court, thought it unnecessary to reach the question of reconsideration (what he termed
"res judicata"). See id. at 252, 116 S.E.2d at 786. In Nationwide, Superior Court Judge
Carr sustained a demurrer and allowed the plaintiff to amend its complaint. See id. at 244,
116 S.E.2d at 781. The defendant moved to strike all portions of the amended complaint
that distinguished it from the original complaint. See id. at 247-48, 116 S.E.2d at 783.
Superior Court Judge Sharp, who would one day sit on the supreme court and be assigned
by Chief Justice Bobbitt to write the majority opinion in Calloway, granted the motion to
strike and ordered the defendant to plead to the "amended complaint." Id. at 244, 116
S.E.2d at 781. If in fact, Judge Sharp's order left the plaintiff's complaint as it stood before
amendment, the order, in effect, vacated the order of Judge Carr sustaining the initial
demurrer. As the plaintiff had acquiesced in Judge Carr's immediately reviewable order,
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Standard Oil simply held that a successor judge may not correct an
order that is imputed law of the case. A sustained demurrer' 52 was
immediately appealable 153 under the provisions of the Consolidated
Statutes in effect at the filing of Standard Oil,5 4 and thus this initial
Judge Sharp should not have reconsidered Judge Carr's sustained demurrer.
While the court in Nationwide did not discuss the impact of Judge Sharp's order
on her predecessor's order to amend, in Burrell v. Dickson Transfer Co., 244 N.C. 662, 94
S.E.2d 829 (1956), Justice Bobbitt, writing for the majority, had addressed the issue of the
binding effect of a discretionary motion to amend where a demurrer had been sustained.
See id. at 664-65, 94 S.E.2d at 831-32. In Burrell, the court interpreted orders of Judge
Sharp--orders granting a motion to dismiss (a demurrer ore tenus) and allowing the
plaintiff to amend its complaint-as the grant of a formal demurrer not pled and an order
to plead over. See id. at 665, 94 S.E.2d at 832. On this interpretation, the court reversed a
subsequent trial judge who quite understandably had treated Judge Sharp's grant of the
demurrer ore tenus as a dismissal and her order to amend as surplusage. See id. at 664-65,
94 S.E.2d at 831-32. While Burrell did let stand Judge Sharp's order to amend, the case
should not be read as supporting the rule laid down in Calloway that "when a judge in his
discretion allows a motion to amend his order binds another Superior Court judge."
Calloway, 281 N.C. at 504, 189 S.E.2d at 490. Rather, the holding in Burrell is consistent
with the rule that a formal demurrer unappealed from should not be reconsidered.
Unfortunately, Burrell grounded it holding on the fact that the interlocutory order in
question was made as a matter of law and that a different judge attempted to correct it at a
subsequent term. See Burrell at 665, 94 S.E.2d at 832. While these factors may have
pertained to the reopening of final orders and judgments, the only factor which prohibited
reconsideration of an interlocutory order under North Carolina law was the immediate
reviewability of such order.
152. A written demurrer under the Code of Civil Procedure of North Carolina is
technically interlocutory, the case being determined if a judgment of dismissal follows. See
MCINTOSH, supra note 39, § 676, at 772. The written or formal demurrer seeks a ruling as
a matter of law. See id. § 437, at 446. It is a pleading, not a motion calling for an order.
See id. § 676, at 772.
153. The immediate appealability of these orders had not always been clear under code
practice. In an early case, a decision on written demurrer was held immediately
reviewable as a matter of established practice. See id. § 676, at 772 (citing Commissioners
of Wake County v. Magnin, 78 N.C. 181 (1878)). The rule later crystallized that appeal
would lie only from final judgment unless the decision on demurrer would end the case,
which did not occur where a right to plead over was given. See id. Still, the issue sparked
dissent. See, e.g., Chambers v. Seaboard Airline Ry. Co., 172 N.C. 555, 557-58, 90 S.E.
590, 593 (1916) (Clark, C.J., dissenting) (stating that an appeal lies from an order
overruling or sustaining a demurrer). The issue was not clearly resolved even after
statutory change seemingly allowed immediate appeal by either party from a ruling on a
demurrer. See MCINTOsH, supra note 39, § 676, at 772-73 ("[Section 15 of the
Consolidated Statutes of North Carolina] provides for an appeal by either party from a
ruling on demurrer, without any limitation, and whether this was intended to change the
rule laid down in the cases cited does not appear to have been decided.").
154. See CONSOLIDATED STATUTES OF NORTH CAROLINA § 515 (1920). Section 515
stated:
Within ten days after the return of the judgment upon the demurrer, if there is no
appeal, or within ten days after the receipt of the certificate from the supreme
court if there is an appeal, if the demurrer is sustained the plaintiff may move,
upon three days notice, for leave to amend the complaint. If this is not granted,
judgment shall be entered dismissing the action. If the demurrer is overruled the
2000] 1837
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
order was imputed law of the case.155
Hardin v. Greene 56 is the final case cited by Calloway to support
the proposition that a grant of a motion to amend may not be
reconsidered. In Hardin, the first trial judge granted in his discretion
a motion to amend to plead the statute of limitations. The second
judge struck the pertinent language in the amended answer. The
objection to the amendment, according to the order of the second
judge, had been the lack of notice that the statute of limitations was
to be pleaded. Apparently, there had been a former suit between the
parties that had been dismissed under an agreement not to plead the
statute of limitations.57 Nonetheless, the majority reversed, stating
that "[s]uch plea is not immoral, and under the terms of the order the
defendant has as much right to set it up as any other plea.
158
Contrary to Calloway, it is not clear that this decision stands for the
proposition that a successor judge has no authority to strike an
amended answer.5 9  At least three alternate readings may be
suggested. The successor judge might have had jurisdiction under the
appropriate statutes to strike the amendment as sham, frivolous,
answer shall be filed within ten days after the receipt of the decision overruling
the demurrer, if there is no appeal .... Otherwise the plaintiff shall be entitled
to judgment by default final or by default and inquiry according to the course and
practice of the court.
Id.
155. Calloway also cited Dockery v. Fairbanks, 172 N.C. 529, 90 S.E. 501 (1916), as in
accord with Standard Oil. In fact, much like Standard Oil, Dockery has not been read by
later cases as only involving a mere interlocutory order, and therefore provides little
support for the proposition advanced in Calloway that the grant of a typical motion to
amend-one that is merely interlocutory-may not be reconsidered. Rather, later cases
appear to classify Dockery as involving an order affecting a substantial right, or one finally
determinative of the rights of the parties. See, e.g., Rutherford College, Inc. v. Payne, 209
N.C. 792,796-97, 184 S.E. 827, 830 (1936); Broadhurst v. Board of Comm'rs, 195 N.C. 439,
444, 142 S.E. 477, 480 (1928); Bland v. Faulkner, 194 N.C. 427, 429, 139 S.E. 835, 836
(1927). In Dockery, the first judge granted a mistrial and right to amend to conform the
pleadings to the facts proven. The initial action was for breach of contract and the
amended complaint alleged fraud. The strike of the amended complaint by the successor
judge was reversed on appeal. At least one commentator agrees with the successor judge
in Dockery that such a variance is often held fatal. See e.g., BOONE, supra note 125, § 219,
at 423 ("Nor can there be a recovery for a tort in an action on contract. The principle is,
that the case really set forth by a party in his pleading cannot be changed upon the trial
into one of a different nature."). It may be worth noting that the supreme court in
Dockery said the successor judge might not ground his reconsideration on the want of
power of his predecessor. See Dockery, 172 N.C. at 530,90 S.E. at 502.
156. 164 N.C. 99,80 S.E. 413 (1913).
157. See id. at 102, 80 S.E. at 415 (Allen, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 101, 80 S.E. at 414.
159. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 503, 189 S.E.2d at 489 ("On appeal it was held that the
judge at a subsequent term was without authority to strike the plea.").
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redundant, or irrelevant, but not to strike for lack of notice. Or, the
successor judge might have had the power to reconsider the order
allowing the amended answer, but erred or abused his discretion in
the exercise of the power. Finally, as the dissent in Hardin suggests,
the successor judge might have had discretionary authority to strike
the amendment, even if he could not set it aside as a matter of law.
16°
Thus it is arguable that the holding later advanced in Temple v.
Western Union Telegraph Co.,161 that a court is at liberty, in its
discretion, to strike out a discretionary order granted at a prior
term,162 may be distinguished from Hardin and may contradict the
rule advanced at this point in Calloway.'63
In summary, our analysis of North Carolina case law is at odds
with Calloway's general statement that "a second judge may not
strike [an amended pleading filed under grant of motion to amend]
on the ground that the first erred in allowing it."'" Rather, a second
judge is prohibited from striking if the doctrine of imputed law of the
case blocks such reconsideration, as in Standard Oil. Of course, when
not prohibited from reconsidering an order, the second judge might
err or abuse his discretion in the exercise of his traditional, plenary
power to reconsider mere interlocutory orders, as arguably was the
case in Hardin. Thus, none of the cases cited by Calloway lends much
support to the general statement that "a second judge may not strike
[an amended pleading filed under grant of motion to amend] on the
ground that the first erred in allowing it,"'65 nor to the broader
restatement later asserted in Calloway that grants of motions to
amend are binding on successor judges.66
In fact, Calloway itself provides good reason to think that some
orders on pleadings, while in the control of the court, may be
reconsidered, for the court cites four cases in which the initial denial
of a discretionary motion was subsequently reconsidered and granted,
and such reconsideration was upheld on appeal. 67 Despite the
160. See Hardin, 164 N.C. at 101-02, 80 S.E. at 414-15 (Allen, J., dissenting). This logic
might be echoed in Farris v. First Citizens Bank and Trust Co., 215 N.C. 466, 467, 2 S.E.2d
363, 363 (1939) (stating that, where the court allows a motion as matter of law, defendants
are entitled to have the motion reconsidered and passed upon as matter of discretion)
(citing Tickle v. Hobgood, 212 N.C. 762,763,194 S.E. 461,474 (1938)).
161. 205 N.C. 441,171 S.E. 630 (1933).
162. See id. at 442,171 S.E. at 631.
163. That Temple might contradict Calloway is ironic, as Calloway cited Temple with
approval. See Calloway, 481 N.C. at 502, 189 S.E.2d at 488.
164. Calloway, 281 N.C. at 502,189 S.E.2d at 489.
165. Id. at 502,189 S.E.2d at 489.
166. See id. at 502,189 S.E.2d at 489-90.
167. See id. at 503-04, 189 S.E.2d at 489-90 (citing Dixie Fire & Cas. Co. v. Esso
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absence of any language in these four cases supporting its
interpretation, the Calloway court dismissed the substance of each
case's holding by asserting that the supreme court had upheld the
result in each case not based on its acknowledgement of the trial
court's inherent power but based on the supreme court's exercise of
its supervisory jurisdiction. 6s In Townsend v. Williams,'69 on review
of an order overruling both the defendant's demurrer and motion to
make more definite, the court stated that the refusal to order a bill of
particulars could be reconsidered before trial because imputed law of
the case did not apply to such a discretionary order.170 Furthermore,
Revis v. Ramsey'7' concluded that a proper case for reconsideration of
a denial of a motion to amend is made when a misapprehension of
fact is alleged,72 because such denial is on an "ordinary motion[ ]
incidental to the progress of a cause" not involving a substantial
right.173 Contrary to the suggestion in Calloway, neither of these
cases indicated that the trial court lacked authority to reconsider the
motion, or that the initial denial was an abuse of discretion, or that in
upholding the successor judge's order the supreme court was
exercising its supervisory jurisdiction. 74 While Overton v. Overton
175
and Dixie Fire & Casualty Co. v. Esso Standard Oil Co., 76 both cited
in Calloway, use language that could be mistaken as permissive, these
cases explicitly invoke the principle that mere discretionary orders
cannot be subject to imputed law of the case. 77 The traditional rule-
Standard Oil Co., 265 N.C. 121, 143 S.E.2d 279 (1965); Overton v. Overton, 259 N.C. 31,
129 S.E.2d 593 (1963); Revis v. Ramsey, 202 N.C. 815, 164 S.E. 358 (1932); Townsend v.
Williams, 117 N.C. 330, 23 S.E. 461 (1895)). Beyond the four cases cited by Calloway,
there is at least another that involves a grant of a discretionary motion that had earlier
been denied, though admittedly it did not involve an initial motion to amend. See State v.
Dewey, 139 N.C. 556, 559, 51 S.E. 937, 938 (1905) ("Besides, the appeal is now useless, for
the motion for a 'Bill of Particulars' being a discretionary matter and its refusal not res
judicata, the motion was renewed ... and was granted, and the defendant had the benefit
of the bill of particulars before his trial....").
168. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 504,189 S.E.2d at 490.
169. 117 N.C. 330,23 S.E. 461 (1895).
170. See id. at 337,23 S.E. at 463.
171. 202 N.C. 815, 164 S.E. 358 (1932).
172. See icl. at 816, 164 S.E. at 358 ("The motion made at the February Term is
different from the one lodged at the October Term. The first was perhaps denied because
it was thought the statute of limitations had already been pleaded.") (citation omitted).
173. Id. at 817, 164 S.E. at 358.
174. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 504, 189 S.E.2d at 490.
175. 260 N.C. 139, 132 S.E.2d 349 (1963).
176. 265 N.C. 121, 143 S.E.2d 279 (1965).
177. See Dixie Fire, 265 N.C. at 130, 143 S.E.2d at 286 (stating that where a prior order
does not affect a substantial right, and therefore is not res judicata, the party may move
the superior court to reconsider); Overton, 260 N.C. at 146, 132 S.E.2d at 354 (same).
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that interlocutory orders imputed to be law of the case may not be
reconsidered by the trial court but that most if not all orders not so
deemed may be reconsidered, whether made as a matter of law or in
the court's discretion-is invoked by each of the four cases cited in
Calloway.
Possibly because these four cases do not directly support
Calloway's analysis that denials of motions to amend may not be
reconsidered on substantially similar facts, the court turned finally to
logical symmetry to bolster its position. Having earlier asserted that
orders on most pleadings, such as motions to strike and grants of
motions to amend, may not be reconsidered without a showing of
changed conditions, the court concluded:
We do not believe that in the foregoing cases the court
intended to lay down the incongruous rule that when a judge
in his discretion allows a motion to amend his order binds
another Superior Court judge, but when he denies the
motion in his discretion another may allow the motion
irrespective of any change in conditions. Such a rule is
logically indefensible and could serve only to undermine the
considerations of orderly procedure, courtesy and comity,
which engendered the rule that one judge may not overrule
or modify the judgment of another.7 8
If orders on motions to strike and denials of demurrers have
been treated as matters of law affecting a substantial right, this is due
to the vagaries of legislation and to the great difficulty in
extrapolating the appeals statute introduced in 1868, which
authorized the immediate review of certain interlocutory orders. 79
Logic does not impel the conclusion that all interlocutory orders
should be treated as immediately reviewable and thereby modifiable
only on changed conditions, as Calloway apparently would require.
Nor does logic impel that all orders on pleadings1O or all orders on
motions to amend 8' be so treated. Logic does not even impel that the
178. Calloway, 281 N.C. at 504, 189 S.E.2d at 490.
179. See supra notes 124-145 and accompanying text; supra notes 153-54 and
accompanying text.
180. Although encyclopedic sources suggest that some courts have viewed orders on
pleadings as unmodifiable as a class, support for such a position rests at least in part on
cases involving initial orders that were immediately appealable. See 30A AM. JUR. Judges
§ 49 (1958) ("[S]ome cases support the doctrine that that view of a question of law which
was taken by one judge in ruling on the pleadings is not to be departed from by another.");
Allen, supra note 6, at 57 (citing Tallassee Power Co. v. Peacock, 197 N.C. 735, 150 S.E.
510 (1929); State v. Standard Oil Co., 205 N.C. 123,170 S.E. 134 (1933)).
181. The narrowest holding of Calloway would be that changed conditions allowed
consideration of this denial of a motion to amend.
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order in Calloway itself" be viewed as unmodifiable without changed
conditions-unless, of course, the pertinent order is seen not as the
initial, discretionary denial of defendant Matthews's motion to
amend, but rather as the immediately reviewable order striking
defendant Matthews's unauthorized amendment that followed shortly
thereafter.
2. Calloway's Holding: The Requirement of Changed Conditions
The remainder of this section focuses on Calloway's requirement
of changed conditions. Even if one accepts the thesis advanced in this
Article, Calloway would have been correct to require changed
conditions for reconsideration if the focal order was that of the
second judge, Judge Beal, which struck the relevant portion of
Matthews's unauthorized amended answer. It is possible that it was
this order, and not the denial by Judge Hasty of Matthews's initial
motion to amend, that caused the third judge, Judge Ervin, to hesitate
when faced with yet another motion to amend by defendant
Matthews. This hesitation would be significant because Judge Beal's
grant of Calloway's motion to strike defendant Matthews's amended
answer was arguably immediately appealable and therefore not
modifiable without changed conditions."s  Judge Beal's order,
underplayed by the supreme court in Calloway,x84 should be kept in
mind when analyzing this question: had conditions sufficiently
changed by the time of Matthews's third motion to amend1a8 so that
Judge Ervin could reconsider the orders entered on prior motion,
even if one such order was imputed law of the case due to its
immediate reviewability?
Judge Ervin was the third judge to preside in Calloway, and his
precise ground for refusing to consider Matthews's renewed motion
to amend was as follows:
182. This order was on defendant Matthews's initial motion to amend to plead the
statute of limitations.
183. See supra notes 134-45 and accompanying text.
184. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 501, 189 S.E.2d at 488 ("The question presented by this
appeal is whether Judge Ervin, in his discretion, had authority to permit an amendment
which Judge Hasty, in his discretion, had denied earlier.").
185. Judge Beal arguably treated the motion to strike Matthews's amended complaint
as an implied motion by Matthews to amend its answer. Thus, Judge Ervin could have
viewed the motion before him as Matthews's third motion to amend its answer.
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and it appearing to the Court that the Honorable Fred H.
Hasty had by order dated May 4, 1970, denied an earlier
motion of the defendant, Matthews Motors, Inc., to amend
its answer to plead the three year statute of limitations in the
exercise of his discretion; that subsequent to May 4, 1970,
the co-defendant, Ford Motor Company, filed an amended
answer pleading the three year Statute of Limitations
against plaintiff; and it appearing further to the Court that
the Honorable Fate J. Beal, Judge Presiding, made an entry
on the pleadings in this cause; that the undersigned is
inclined to grant the motion of Matthews Motors, Inc. dated
October 20, 1970, so that said defendant can also allege the
three year Statute of Limitations against plaintiff's claim,
but does not have the authority to exercise his discretion but
must rule as a matter of law.
8 6
Ten days after Judge Hasty's order denying Matthews's motion
to amend, Matthews filed an amended answer which alleged, inter
alia, the running of the statute of limitations and which stated that it
was filed with leave of court granted by Judge Hasty. The new
pleading raising the defense of the statute of limitations was stricken
by Judge Beal on plaintiff's motion, which had pointed out that leave
to amend to plead the statute of limitations had been denied by Judge
Hasty only ten days earlier."s Other than the filing of the amended
answer by seller Matthews and a filing four days earlier by
manufacturer Ford with a virtually identical preamble alleging that
the amendment had been filed with the court's permission, there is no
indication that Judge Hasty had reconsidered his denial of seller's
motion to amend, and in its recital of the facts, the supreme court
stated that "[t]his amended answer.., is supported by no order in the
record.' 18 8  Furthermore, the supreme court refers to the
manufacturer's virtually identical amendment as "the amended
answer which Ford had filed without permission,"'89 which may
indicate how the court viewed seller Matthews's amended answer.
It appears that Judge Hasty rotated out of the district shortly
after denying the motion to amend filed by seller Matthews. Judge
Beal was apparently holding court in the district when Ford filed its
amended answer, which included the defense of the running of the
statute of limitations, and asserted that the filing was with permission
186. Order (November 12, 1970), BRIEFS & RECORDS, SPRING TERM 1972, No. 64, at
54.
187. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 499,189 S.E.2d at 487.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 505,189 S.E.2d at 490 (emphasis added).
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of Judge Hasty-which action was quickly imitated by Matthews. It is
possible that each defendant in fact received permission to amend its
answer from Judge Hasty, but no such orders appear in the record. It
is also possible, as the supreme court asserts in its opinion, that Ford,
seeing Judge Hasty's denial of the motion of the similarly situated
defendant, feared a denial, too, and so filed an amended answer
without permission.
Calloway did not initially object to the amendment filed by Ford,
but did move to strike the amended answer of Matthews. 190 Judge
Beal granted Calloway's motion to strike as to those portions of the
amended answer alleging the running of the statute of limitations.
Because Judge Beal's order was on "a motion to strike an averment
from a pleading ... he rule[d] as a matter of law, whether he
allow[ed] or disallow[ed] the motion. No discretion [was] involved
and his ruling finally determine[d] the rights of the parties unless it is
reversed upon appeal."'191 As this was an immediately reviewable
order in which Matthews acquiesced, it was imputed law of the case,
and could thus not be reconsidered without new facts or a change of
condition.
The ground on which Judge Beal struck the pertinent portion of
the amended answer is not stated in the record, but he may have
struck the amended pleading on the ground that no permission to
amend had been granted. If Matthews amended its answer knowing
that it lacked authority to do so and knowingly misrepresented to the
court that it had such permission, then it is questionable whether
allowing a subsequent motion to amend would ever be in furtherance
of justice, even if such misconduct was considered in light of changed
conditions."9  Although subsequent facts may permit a successor
judge to exercise discretion, still she should not exercise it to reward
such behavior.
On whatever ground Judge Beal struck Matthews's amended
answer, it is clear that at the time of this strike, defendant Ford had
already filed its amended answer pleading the statute of limitations.
Judge Beal was aware that his order resulted in the uneven treatment
of the defendants because Ford had been allowed to so plead. For
this reason, when the successor judge, Judge Ervin, faced yet another
renewal of the motion by Matthews to amend its pleading, he could
190. See supra note 77.
191. Calloway, 281 N.C. at 502,189 S.E.2d at489.
192. The dismissal enjoyed by co-defendant Ford on the ground of the running of the
statute of limitations might be such a changed condition.
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not consider Ford's amendment of its pleading as a subsequent fact or
material change in condition empowering him to hear Matthews's
renewed motion. Ford's amended answer was a fact that existed at
the time of Judge Beal's decision, that is, a fact that had been
considered the last time Matthews moved to amend its answer.
Between Judge Beal's order on or after May 20 and Judge
Ervin's order on November 12, 1970, there had been some new
developments that Judge Ervin might have considered and that the
supreme court indicated were changed conditions or new facts
sufficient to give the judge jurisdiction to hear the renewed motion.'93
The court found it significant that Judge Ervin himself had ruled one
week earlier that Ford's amended answer would not be stricken 194 and
that Ford was entitled to summary judgment on the strength of its
plea of the statute of limitations. It is worth considering whether
these decisions in Ford's favor should fairly amount to new facts or
changed conditions creating jurisdiction to hear Matthews's renewed
motion to amend. Judge Ervin entered orders in favor of Ford even
though Matthews's motion to amend its answer had been filed earlier.
Had Judge Ervin responded to the motions in the sequence in which
they were filed, the rulings affecting Ford would not have existed and
could not then have been subsequent facts supporting
reconsideration. It is not obvious that a judge's own orders in a case
should amount to the changed conditions necessary for
reconsideration of another order subject to imputed law of the case.
Such a rule seems especially murky and undesirable as applied in this
case, where the trial judge's prompt disposal of a summary judgment
motion is later said to have created the jurisdiction he needed to hear
an earlier filed motion. Judge Ervin may have rejected this argument.
If Matthews's motion was not subject to reconsideration, it was not
relevant whether or not Judge Ervin had waited the three weeks to
enter his decision. Matthews had acquiesced in Judge Beal's
reviewable order striking its amended answer, and no changed
conditions occurred which should be said to so change the issue as to
raise a legally distinct point. Arguably, then, Calloway wrongly
decided that there was a change of condition distinguishing the
193. The new facts emphasized in Calloway do not exhaust the argument. Other new
facts might legally differentiate the positions of Judges Beal and Ervin, such as a July
ruling by Judge Beal on indemnification. Calloway, however, does not point to these as
relevant new facts.
194. Calloway interprets this order as impliedly granting to Ford a motion to amend in
order to plead the statute of limitations. That motion was never made, but was implied by
its action of filing without permission six months earlier.
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motion facing Judge Ervin from those motions which had faced
Judges Hasty and Beal.
III. THE POST-CALLOWAY DEVELOPMENT OF THE RULE
A. In the North Carolina Supreme Court
As discussed in Section II, Calloway quoted, with apparent
approval, the majority rule that "[i]nterlocutory orders are subject to
change 'at any time to meet the justice and equity of the case upon
sufficient grounds shown for the same.' "95 Nowhere does Calloway
explicitly overrule the majority rule that a successor judge may
reconsider a mere interlocutory order on substantially similar facts.
Indeed, a narrow reading of Calloway's holding-that changed
conditions sufficed to allow a successor judge to grant a motion to
amend where an earlier motion to amend had been denied by another
judge-is not inconsistent with the majority rule. It can be argued
that the remaining legal analysis and rationale in Calloway is properly
viewed as nonbinding dicta196 that should be disregarded.'9 This may
195. Id. at 502, 189 S.E.2d at 488 (quoting Miller v. Justice, 86 N.C. 26, 30 (1882) and
citing Bland v. Faulkner, 194 N.C. 427, 139 S.E. 835 (1927)).
196. The narrow holding in Calloway is consistent with the two traditional rules that
(1) given substantially similar facts, a trial judge in a proper case has inherent power to
reconsider orders that are not imputed law of the case; and (2) on changed conditions, a
trial judge has jurisdiction to hear a renewed motion even if the order on the prior motion
was imputed law of the case. Consistent with the second rule, as stated above, Calloway
held that changed conditions empowered the third judge to hear the renewed motion to
amend. As these two rules provide independent jurisdictional grounds to hear a renewal,
and the court disposed of the case on the second rule, its opinion need not have reached
the applicability of the first rule. In this sense, Calloway's holding is not inconsistent with
the first rule, though admittedly its rationale raises some serious questions. Nevertheless,
the consistency of Calloway's holding with prior law remains whether the impact of Judge
Hasty's initial order was solely at issue on appeal, or whether the impact of both Judge
Hasty's and Beal's orders were at issue. In the former case, a subsequent judge could have
heard the renewal on changed conditions, and in the latter a subsequent judge could only
have heard the renewal on changed conditions. In either case, Calloway had no need to
address the scope of the power to reconsider on substantially similar facts. Insofar as a
holding is confined to utterances in an opinion necessary to the settlement of the rights of
the parties, Calloway's discussion of the first traditional rule is dicta.
197. Two reasons for distinguishing holdings from dicta are accuracy and legitimacy:
"[d]icta are less carefully considered than holdings, and, therefore, less likely to be
accurate statements of law," and "dicta have no precedential effect because courts have
legitimate authority only to decide cases, not to make law in the abstract." Michael C.
Dorf, Dicta and Article 111, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1997, 2000-01 (1994); see also Moose v.
Comm'r, 172 N.C. 419, 433-34, 90 S.E. 441, 448-49 (1916) ("The question actually before
the Court is investigated with care and considered in its full extent. Other principles which
may serve to illustrate it are considered in their relation to the case decided, but their
possible bearing on all other cases is seldom completely investigated."). Dicta should not
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have been what Justice Higgins had in mind when he concurred only
in the result in Calloway.
The North Carolina Supreme Court cases that have discussed
reconsideration in the years since Calloway have not clearly resolved
the status of the pre-Calloway rule. Consider Sales Co. v. Board of
Transportation, a case filed five years after Calloway."8 In Sales, the
court cited Calloway as authority for application of the majority rule
to interlocutory orders:
A severance order is an interlocutory order, that is, one
incidental to the progress of the cause which does not affect
a substantial right of the parties. As such, it may be
subsequently modified by the presiding judge upon a
determination that present circumstances warrant such
action. "Interlocutory orders are subject to change 'at any
time to meet the justice and equity of the case upon
sufficient grounds shown for the same.' "199
Sales's focus on "present circumstances" might be read to endorse the
continued applicability of the majority rule and a belief that Calloway
had followed and applied the majority rule in its holding.
Subsequent supreme court cases are less easily interpreted as
endorsing the pre-Calloway rule, but they still do not appear clearly
to reject the majority rule. For instance, in State v. Duvall,2 ° the court
noted the "general impropriety" of a trial judge's correction of legal
error in the prior ruling of another judge in the same case, which
arguably restates the majority rule, albeit with a heavy emphasis on
the need for hesitation by the successor judge, and also acknowledged
the power of the court to consider a renewal upon "a sufficient
showing of a substantial change in circumstances during the interim
which presently warrants a different or new disposition of the
matter."' In State v. Stokes,202 the court cited Duvall for the
proposition that "[t]o permit one superior court judge to overrule the
final order or judgment of another would result in the disruption of
the orderly process of a trial and the usurpation of the reviewing
influence a later decision unless it logically assists in answering the new question. See
Muncie v. Insurance Co., 253 N.C. 74, 79, 116 S.E.2d 474, 477 (1960). See generally Earl
Maltz, The Nature of Precedent, 66 N.C. L. REv. 367,367-93 (1988) (examining the role of
precedent in judicial decisionmaking).
198. 292 N.C. 437,233 S.E.2d 569 (1977).
199. Sales, 292 N.C. at 444,233 S.E.2d at 574 (quoting Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281
N.C. 496,502,189 S.E.2d 484,488 (1972)).
200. 304 N.C. 557,284 S.E.2d 495 (1981).
201. Id. at 562,284 S.E.2d at 499.
202. 308 N.C. 634,304 S.E.2d 184 (1983).
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function of appellate courts."2 3 This restriction to a "final order or
judgment" is clearly consistent with the majority rule. Stokes goes on
to restate with approval other versions of the majority rule: (1) "This
rule [that one judge may not overrule another] does not apply,
however, to interlocutory orders given during the progress of an
action which affect the procedure and conduct of the trial; '20 4 (2) "An
interlocutory order or judgment does not determine the issues in the
cause but directs further proceedings preliminary to the final
decree; '1 °5 and (3) "Such order or judgment is subject to change
during the pendency of the action to meet the exigencies of the
case."0 6 The actual holding in Stokes was that the successor judge
(the trial judge) had authority to deny defendant's motion for
individual voir dire of jurors even though the first judge had ordered
individual voir dire in a pre-trial ruling.2°
In State v. Sams,2 8 the successor judge denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss for speedy trial violation based on an order of the
first judge granting the state a continuance and expressly stating that
the time period associated with the continuance be excluded from the
Speedy Trial Act's requirements.209 Although Sams states that the
successor judge "could not have given defendant relief for.., alleged
error" in the first judge's granting of the continuance (citing Calloway
for the "well established rule in North Carolina is that no appeal lies
from one Superior Court judge to another; that one Superior Court
judge may not correct another's errors of law"),210 this statement is
dictum because the successor judge did not attempt to overrule or
modify the first judge's order.211 It is also relevant that Sams involved
an appeal from a final judgment and that the defendant failed to
except to and appeal the first judge's order; thus, to allow the
defendant to argue that the successor judge committed error by
failing to correct the first judge's erroneous order would, in Sams,
have interfered directly with the appellate process.
2 12
203. Id. at 642,304 S.E.2d at 189 (citing Duvall, 304 N.C. 557,284 S.E.2d 495).
204. Id.
205. Id. at 642,304 S.E.2d at 190.
206. Id.
207. See id.
208. 317 N.C. 230,345 S.E.2d 179 (1986).
209. See id. at 234, 345 S.E.2d at 182.
210. Id. at 235,345 S.E.2d at 182 (citing Calloway, 281 N.C. at 501,189 S.E.2d at 488).
211. See id. at 234-35, 345 S.E.2d at 182-83.
212. As the court stated, "defendant took no exception to [the first judge's] order. He
has therefore failed to preserve any error or mistake of law found therein for appellate
review." Id at 235,345 S.E.2d at 182.
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Able Outdoor, Inc. v. Harrelson213 cites Calloway for the
proposition that "[o]ne superior court judge may not overrule
another, '214 yet Able Outdoor is also not an interlocutory order case.
Rather, in Able Outdoor there was a final judgment, and the
defendant filed a Rule 60(b)215 motion for relief from judgment on the
grounds that the judgment was void. The successor judge granted the
Rule 60(b) motion on the basis that the first judge lacked jurisdiction
to enter the judgment. The court held that the first judge had
jurisdiction to enter the judgment so that the successor judge's
conclusion was erroneous.2 16  Furthermore, although Hieb v.
Lowery217 cited Calloway for the proposition that "[o]rdinarily, one
superior court judge may not modify or overrule the judgment of
another superior court judge in the same case on the same issue,' 21 8 it
too is not an interlocutory order case. It appears to be a final
judgment case, as the plaintiffs' styled their motion as a Rule 60(b)
matter, even though the court refused to consider the issue in Rule
60(b) terms. Nevertheless, the basis for the court's holding was not
that the successor judge erred because he had overruled previous
orders but that the successor judge's conclusion that he had statutory
authority to modify "the previous judgments" was erroneous.219
Two other cases may be instructive. In State v. McClure,220 the
defendant, charged with first degree murder, accepted a plea bargain
to second degree murder. The first judge to hear the matter rejected
the guilty plea based upon the defendant's responses in open court
that raised doubts as to the voluntariness of the plea. At the next
session of court, the same plea bargain was presented to a second
judge who found, after an extended inquiry, the plea to have been
freely and voluntarily made and accepted the plea. On appeal, the
defendant argued that the second judge had reversed, modified or
213. 341 N.C. 167,459 S.E.2d 626 (1995).
214. Id. at 169,459 S.E.2d at 627 (citing Calloway, 281 N.C. at 501, 189 S.E.2d at 488).
215. Rule 60(b) authorizes the court to relieve a party from a final judgment to serve
the ends of justice, but it is not a substitute for appellate review and cannot be used to
correct erroneous judgments.
216. See id. at 171, 459 S.E.2d at 628.
217. 344 N.C. 403,474 S.E.2d 323 (1996), modified on other grounds, 134 N.C. App. 21,
1999 N.C. App. LEXIS 907 (1999), review denied, 351 N.C. 103, 1999 N.C. LEXIS 1238
(1999).
218. Id. at 407, 474 S.E.2d at 325 (citing Calloway, 281 N.C. at 501, 189 S.E.2d at 488).
219. The supreme court held that the court of appeals "did not err in concluding that
Judge Sitton did not have authority under the provisions of N.C.G.S. § 97-10.20) to
modify the previous judgments." Id. at 410,474 S.E.2d at 327 (1996).
220. 280 N.C. 288,185 S.E.2d 693 (1972).
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overruled the first judge." McClure avoided the issue by holding
that the second judge's acceptance of the plea did not modify,
overrule, or set aside the order of the first judge because the first
judge's order had actually been only to continue the case (after
refusing to accept the plea) so that the second judge had properly
considered the plea de novo.m In Atkinson v. Atkinson,223 the North
Carolina Supreme Court reversed a decision by the court of appeals
that had disagreed with the trial court's determination that a
sufficient change of circumstance had occurred to allow
reconsideration of a discretionary motion to dismiss.24 Although one
might argue that this constituted tacit approval of the court of
appeals's basic analysis, if not of its ultimate conclusion, the actual
holding in Atkinson differs little from that in Calloway because the
court held that the intervening circumstances sufficed to allow
reconsideration of an interlocutory order.' A question must be
squarely before the court before its decision on the issue becomes
binding. 6
Thus, it is arguable that the supreme court has never explicitly
overruled the long-standing rule in North Carolina that
"[i]nterlocutory orders are subject to change at any time to meet the
justice and equity of the case upon sufficient grounds shown for the
same." 7 If binding precedent is limited to a court's determination of
the specific legal consequence that attaches to a detailed set of
facts," then the holding in Calloway229 did not alter the applicable
221. See id. at 294, 185 S.E.2d at 697.
222. See id. at 295,185 S.E.2d at 697.
223. 350 N.C. 590,516 S.E.2d 381 (1999) (per curiam).
224. See id.
225. In Atkinson, the supreme court again adopted language that is more reminiscent
of the pre-Calloway rule: reconsideration is allowed when the "ends of justice" are best
served by reconsidering the order. See id. (adopting the dissenting opinion of the court of
appeals).
226. In Rhyne v. Lipscombe, 122 N.C. 650, 29 S.E. 57 (1898), the supreme court held
that no appeal lay from statutorily created courts directly to the supreme court despite
acknowledging that many appeals from these courts had been taken directly to the
supreme court and that the supreme court had both heard and resolved the matters being
appealed. These earlier cases did not establish the correctness of such direct appeals
because the issue had never been properly raised or appealed in any of the cases and was
therefore never properly before the court. See id. at 656-57, 29 S.E. at 58-59.
227. Calloway, 281 N.C. at 502,189 S.E.2d at 488 (citations omitted).
228. This definition has been adopted by many commentators. See, e.g., Ruggero J.
Aldisert, Precedent What It Is and What It Isn't; When Do We Kiss It and When Do We
Kill It?, 17 PEPP. L. REV. 605, 607 (1990) (stating that a case is important for what it
decides-i.e., the what and not the why or how); Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL.
L. REV. 283, 298 (1989) ("[T]he judge has authority to pronounce only on issues that are
properly raised by the particular facts of the case before her."); Paul W. Werner, The
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pre-Calloway precedent. If so, then the line of court of appeals cases
discussed in the following section might be of limited precedential
value because the court of appeals is bound by stare decisis to follow
the precedents of the supreme court and is not empowered to
overrule such precedentY0 Indeed, although it is an uncomfortable
position to occupy, the trial courts are also obliged to follow the
precedents of the supreme court"' despite any clear language in
opinions of the court of appeals that misrepresent those precedents.
B. In the North Carolina Court of Appeals
In the absence of more specific guidance from the supreme court,
the court of appeals has fleshed out a rule that extends the Calloway
analysis to all interlocutory orders. Unlike the narrow holding of
Calloway (as distinguished from its rationale), the rule the court of
appeals has developed is not compatible with the pre-Calloway
majority rule. Although the court of appeals has coaxed several
Straits of Stare Decisis and the Utah Court of Appeals: Navigating the Scylla of Under-
Application and the Charybdis of Over-Application, 1994 BYU L. REV. 633, 639 (1994)
("When a court lays down a rule of law attaching a specific legal consequence to a detailed
set of facts, the court must adhere to the legal principle it has announced by applying it in
all subsequent cases that come before it presenting a similar factual premise."); see also
Rodwell v. Rowland, 137 N.C. 617, 638, 50 S.E. 319, 327 (1905) ("More is needful to
constitute a precedent than merely that a principle or doctrine is announced within the
appropriate limits of a cause. [A] precedent must be a conclusion, a decision in a cause,
and not a process of reasoning, an illustration, or analogy.") (quoting J.C. WELLS, RES
ADJUDICATA & STARE DECIsIs 531 (Des Moines, Mills & Co. 1879)).
229. Applying this definition of what constitutes binding precedent, the holding in
Calloway was simply that on the unique facts as stated therein a judge has authority to
grant a renewed motion to amend a pleading even when the motion had previously been
denied by another judge.
230. The court of appeals has "no authority to overrule decisions of [the] Supreme
Court and [has] the responsibility to follow those decisions 'until otherwise ordered by the
Supreme Court.'" Dunn v. Pate, 334 N.C. 115, 118, 431 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1993) (quoting
Cannon v. Miller, 313 N.C. 324, 324, 327 S.E.2d 888, 888 (1985)); see also Jones v. Kearns,
120 N.C. App. 301, 304, 462 S.E.2d 245, 246-47 (1995) (stating that the court of appeals is
bound by the "clear and unambiguous precedent of our Supreme Court").
231. See Dunn, 106 N.C. App. at 60, 415 S.E.2d at 104 (stating that stare decisis is
followed by the courts of this state and that under this doctrine the determination of a
point of law by a court will generally be followed by a court of the same or lower rank if a
subsequent case presents the same legal problem), rev'd on other grounds, 334 N.C. 115,
118, 431 S.E.2d 178, 180 (1993) (holding that the trial court properly followed the
precedent of the United States Supreme Court concerning a constitutional question even
when that result conflicted with an otherwise on-point holding of the North Carolina
Supreme Court); State v. Daye, 78 N.C. App. 753, 756, 338 S.E.2d 557, 560 (1986) (stating
that if an appellate court has squarely ruled that certain evidence does not support a
certain factor, and the identical evidence is offered at the resentencing hearing to support
the same factor, the trial court is bound by the appellate ruling, not because it is the law of
the case, but because it is binding precedent directly on point).
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versions" of the rule out of the imprecise language of Calloway, the
rule that the court has settled on is that a trial judge has the power to
modify or change an interlocutory order only when (1) the order was
discretionary; and (2) there has been a change of circumstances.2 13
This rule extends the requirement of changed conditions to all
232. Several cases appear to hold that reconsideration is always allowed if the previous
interlocutory order was entered at a different stage of the proceeding. See, e.g., Shamley
v. Shamley, 117 N.C. App. 175, 184, 455 S.E.2d 435, 440 (1994) ("The rule does not apply
where the prior order is rendered at a different stage of the proceedings, where the
materials considered are not the same, and where the issues are not the same."); see also
Smithwick v. Crutchfield, 87 N.C. App. 374, 376, 361 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1987) (noting that
the first order was "rendered at a different stage of the proceeding"). This holding is not
inconsistent with Calloway's apparent analysis that there are different categories of
interlocutory orders with different applicable rules, e.g., "res judicata does not apply to
decisions upon ordinary motions incidental to the progress of the trial with the same
strictness as to a judgment," but the question remains whether ordinary motions incidental
to the progress of the trial includes all interlocutory orders or only some subset thereof.
Calloway, 281 N.C. at 501-02, 189 S.E.2d at 488; see also State v. Stokes, 308 N.C. 634, 642,
304 S.E.2d 184, 189 (1983) (holding that the trial judge was not bound by a pretrial order
entered by another judge which provided for individual voir dire of prospective jurors
because the rule that one judge may not review orders, judgments, or actions of another
judge of coordinate jurisdiction does not apply to interlocutory orders given during the
progress of action which affect procedure and conduct of trial). Another line of cases
indicates that reconsideration is never allowed if the previous interlocutory order finally
determined the rights of the parties. See, e.g., McArdle Corp. v. Patterson, 115 N.C. App.
528, 532, 445 S.E.2d 604, 606-07 (1994) ("[W]here a judge rules as a matter of law, as on a
motion for summary judgment, the rights of the parties are finally determined, subject
only to reversal on appeal."); Whitley's Elec. Serv. v. Walston, 105 N.C. App. 609, 611,414
S.E.2d 47, 48 (1992) ("Even though it is interlocutory in terms of appealability, a ruling on
a motion for summary judgment involves an issue of law, not discretion .... Where a
judge rules as a matter of law, the rights of the parties are finally determined, subject only
to reversal on appeal."); American Travel Corp. v. Central Carolina Bank, 57 N.C. App.
437, 440, 291 S.E.2d 892, 894 (1982) (acknowledging that the rule prohibiting
reconsideration "does not apply to interlocutory orders given in the progress of the cause"
but then determining that this applies only to "merely interlocutory" orders and not to
orders that finally determine a right); Carr v. Carbon Corp., 49 N.C. App. 631, 633, 272
S.E.2d 374, 376 (1980). This approach is also not clearly inconsistent with Calloway's
apparent analysis that there are different categories of interlocutory orders with different
applicable rules. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 502, 189 S.E.2d at 489 ("When a judge rules
upon a motion to strike ... [,] he rules as a matter of law .... No discretion is involved
and his ruling finally determines the rights of the parties.").
233. See Madry v. Madry, 106 N.C. App. 34, 38,415 S.E.2d 74,77 (1992) (stating that if
the interlocutory order "is one which was addressed to the discretion of the trial judge,
another trial court judge may rehear an issue and enter a contradictory ruling if there has
been a material change in the circumstances of the parties") (citing Calloway, 281 N.C. at
505, 189 S.E.2d at 493); Whitley's, 105 N.C. App. at 611, 414 S.E.2d at 48 (stating that
"there are two requirements which must be met before a modification of a prior
interlocutory order is proper: (1) the prior order was discretionary and (2) there has been
a substantial change in circumstances"); Iverson v. TM One, Inc., 92 N.C. App. 161, 164,
374 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1988); Stone v. Martin, 69 N.C. App. 650, 652, 318 S.E.2d 108, 110
(1984); Carr, 49 N.C. App. at 633,272 S.E.2d at 376.
1852 [Vol. 78
2000] RECONSIDERATION 1853
discretionary orders without regard to the orders' immediate
reviewability under the appeals statute. Worse still, the rule
absolutely precludes reconsideration of interlocutory orders made as
a matter of law, even though neither the decision, holding, nor
rationale of Calloway directly addressed the subject. Even if the
pedigree of the court of appeals rule were not suspect, however, its
rule has proven difficult to apply consistently and fairly, even on its
own terms. For this reason alone, the court of appeals rule should be
reconsidered.
1. No Clear Test for What Constitutes the Change in Circumstance
That Establishes the Authority to Reconsider
The court of appeals rule expressly provides for jurisdiction to
reconsider discretionary orders if there has been a sufficient change
of circumstance or condition. The cases, however, fail to articulate a
clear rule as to when such changes are sufficient.' For instance, in
234. See State v. Duvall, 304 N.C. 557, 562, 284 S.E.2d 495, 499 (1981) (holding that
neither the mere passage of time between the date one superior court judge disposes of a
motion and the date the same motion is subsequently renewed before another judge, nor
the presentation of additional evidence upon a renewed motion, if such evidence does not
consist of new and different facts which were not before the first judge originally ruling
upon the motion, were changed circumstances sufficient to justify reconsideration); Home
Indem. Co. v. Hoechst Celanese Corp., 128 N.C. App. 113, 121-22,493 S.E.2d 806, 811-12
(1997) (holding that an action to determine insurance coverage for environmental
contamination claims at 94 sites in 20 states, the entry of partial summary judgment
effectively ending controversies as to all North Carolina sites, and plaintiffs' motion to
amend the complaint to add 142 additional sites and claims to this case, constituted
changed conditions which permitted the trial judge to overrule another superior court
judge's order lifting an earlier stay and permitting the controversy to proceed by entering
another order staying further litigation in North Carolina concerning sites located in other
states); Dublin v. UCR, Inc., 115 N.C. App. 209, 220, 444 S.E.2d 455, 461-62 (1994)
(holding that the trial court erred by vacating another judge's order of class certification as
to the original defendants based on the addition of new defendants and purported new
claims against them where the new defendants and purported new claims in no way
affected the nature of the claims asserted against the original defendants, because there
were no changed circumstances on the issue of class certification as to the original
defendants). One further example is Stone, 69 N.C. App. at 650,318 S.E.2d at 108. In this
case, involving a civil suit, the defendants refused to respond to the plaintiffs' discovery
requests even after a judge ordered them to respond. Consequently the first judge
imposed Rule 37(b) sanctions. The defendants appealed from the order imposing
sanctions, but it was upheld. The defendants then moved that the trial court set aside the
sanctions that included an order of default, and the second judge granted the motion. The
plaintiffs appealed, contending that second judge had "effectively conducted appellate
review, without jurisdiction to do so, when he set aside the sanctions imposed by another
superior court judge." Id. at 652, 318 S.E.2d at 100. The court of appeals held that the
first judge's order imposing sanctions was a discretionary interlocutory order so that the
second judge had authority to set aside the order if a change of circumstances warranted
such action. The second judge noted: (1) that defendants had relied upon the good faith
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Atkinson v. Atkinson,' the trial court found specific and detailed
"intervening circumstances" that justified reconsideration of an order
denying an earlier motion to dismiss, including the failure of the
plaintiff to prosecute her case diligently, significant evidentiary
problems caused by the delay in hearing the matter, and the failure of
both parties to comply with discovery requirements. Despite
acknowledging the authority of a judge to reconsider a discretionary
interlocutory order if there has been "a material change in the
circumstances of the parties," the court of appeals, without discussion
or analysis, concluded that the circumstances enumerated by the trial
judge "were not material changes in circumstances permitting the
trial judge to overrule" the previous order.z 6 Yet, one of the court of
appeals judges dissented on the grounds that the noted changes in
circumstances since the entry of the first order were sufficient to
justify reconsideration1 7 Thus the four judges who had considered
the matter were evenly split on the issue and yet the majority opinion
did not even attempt to articulate the test that it applied. On appeal,
the North Carolina Supreme Court reversed in a per curiam opinion
"[flor the reasons stated in the dissenting opinion.' 23s The reason
stated in the dissent was that although the first judge had held that
"the ends of justice would best be served" by the denial of the motion
to dismiss, the intervening circumstances caused the "ends of justice"
to no longer be served by denying the motion.2 9
There is little guidance and little agreement as to what
constitutes a sufficient change of circumstance or condition that
restores the jurisdiction of a trial judge to reconsider an interlocutory
order. Because this rule is jurisdictional, the consequences of
misapplying it are severe. If a judge fails to recognize that the rule
applies to prevent his reconsideration of an interlocutory order or if
the judge applies the rule but mistakenly concludes that a sufficient
change of circumstance has created jurisdiction to reconsider, then
advice of counsel not to answer the discovery requests because the information was
privileged; (2) that this advice was reasonably based on then-existing case law; and (3) that
appellate decisions had restricted the scope of the privilege during the course of
defendants' appeal, to their detriment. The court held that these facts constituted "a
significant change of circumstances" since the first judge's imposition of sanctions. Id. at
652-54,318 S.E.2d at 110-11.
235. 132 N.C. App. 82,510 S.E.2d 178 (1999), rev'd on other grounds, 350 N.C. 590,516
S.E.2d 381 (1999).
236. Id. at 88-89,510 S.E.2d at 181.
237. See i at 90,510 S.E.2d at 182 (Greene, J., dissenting).
238. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 350 N.C. 590,516 S.E.2d 381 (1999).
239. Atkinson, 132 N.C. App. at 90,510 S.E.2d at 182 (Greene, J., dissenting).
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the judge's decision upon reconsideration is a nullity for want of
jurisdiction. An objection that the court has acted without
jurisdiction can be made at any time, including for the first time on
appeal, and there is no requirement that the error be raised or
excepted to at the trial level-defects in jurisdiction are not waived by
failure to object contemporaneously. 240 Indeed, the appellate court
must consider the matter ex mero motu even if the parties never
address the question. 241 On the other hand, if the judge mistakenly
concludes that the rule applies so that he lacks jurisdiction to
reconsider and so refuses to exercise his discretion to reconsider, that
too is reversible error.2 42 The consequences of misunderstanding or
misapplying the rule can thus lead to remands, new trials, and
reduced judicial efficiency.
2. No Adequate Response Available at the Trial Level When an
Interlocutory Order is Based on a Manifest Error of Law
The interlocutory order in Calloway involved a discretionary
matter and not a question of law; consequently, Calloway may not
compel the conclusion that the rules governing reconsideration differ
depending on whether the order involved a question of law or a
discretionary ruling. Nevertheless, a long line of cases from the court
of appeals has adopted this distinction.2 43 The clearest rule followed
240. See State v. Sams, 317 N.C. 230,235,345 S.E.2d 179, 182 (1986) ("An order is void
ab initio only when it is issued by a court that does not have jurisdiction. Such an order is
a nullity and may be attacked either directly or collaterally, or may simply be ignored.");
Vance Constr. Co. v. Duane White Land Corp., 127 N.C. App. 493, 494, 490 S.E.2d 588,
589 (1997) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action .... An
objection to subject matter jurisdiction may be made at any time during the course of the
action."); see also Able Outdoor, Inc. v. Harrelson, 341 N.C. 167, 169, 459 S.E.2d 626, 627
(1995) (stating that if the first judge did not have jurisdiction to act, his order was a nullity
and the second judge could strike the order).
241. See Vance Constr., 127 N.C. App. at 494-95,490 S.E.2d at 589-90.
242. See Calloway, 281 N.C. at 505, 189 S.E.2d at 490-91 ("When a motion addressed
to the discretion of the court is denied upon the ground that the court has no power to
grant the motion in its discretion, the ruling is reviewable.").
243. A number of cases do not include this distinction in their analysis. For example,
Dublin v. UCR, Inc., 115 N.C. App. 209, 444 S.E.2d 455 (1994), defines the rule but does
not mention any law/discretionary distinction when it states that "interlocutory orders are
modifiable for changed circumstances" and "a subsequent judge could modify the order
for circumstances which changed the legal foundation for the prior order." Id at 219-20,
444 S.E.2d at 461.
It should be noted that the rule, as expressed by the court of appeals cases cited
supra note 233, has never been expressly adopted by the supreme court. In State v. Duvall,
304 N.C. 557, 284 S.E.2d 495 (1981), the supreme court did not recognize a
legal/discretionary distinction when it discussed "the general impropriety of a superior
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by the court of appeals fails to provide for any circumstances under
which an interlocutory order resolving a question of law can be
reconsidered. But orders resolving legal issues are sometimes based
on clear, manifest errors of law, for instance, the denial of a motion
for summary judgment when case law clearly required the granting of
the motion. The issue can also arise when the moving party is able, at
some time after the order denying summary judgment is entered, to
supplement its forecast of evidence sufficiently to show conclusively
that there is no issue of material fact.244 The rule allows no option for
court judge's rectification of what he might perceive to be legal error in the prior ruling of
another superior court judge in the same case," but acknowledged the authority to
overrule upon a showing of sufficient changed circumstances. Id. at 562, 284 S.E.2d at 498.
In State v. Sams, 317 N.C. 230, 345 S.E.2d 179 (1986), it is unclear whether the court is
applying the rule, as the court is not clear whether the first judge's ruling was a matter of
law or discretion. See id at 234,345 S.E.2d at 182.
244. The case law appears uncertain as to the significance of new evidence or new
arguments on the authority to reconsider questions of law. For instance, in Carr v. Carbon
Corp., 49 N.C. App. 631, 272 S.E.2d 374 (1980), the defendant argued that the second
judge properly considered the defendant's second motion for summary judgment because
the "materials presented to the court on the second motion ... were different from those
at the [first] hearing." Id at 632, 272 S.E.2d at 376. These additional materials included
fourteen depositions and seven witness affidavits. The court of appeals held that the
additional materials made no difference because "the legal issue raised by the second
motion was identical to the legal issue on the first motion." I& at 634, 272 S.E.2d at 377.
The court opined that "[i]f defendants' contention is permitted to prevail, an unending
series of motions for summary judgment could ensue so long as the moving party
presented some additional evidence at the hearing on each successive motion." Id. The
court also noted, however, that its rule did not always limit a party to one motion for
summary judgment. Where the second motion "presents legal issues that are different
from those raised in the prior motion, such motion would be appropriate." Id. at 635, 272
S.E.2d at 377. Questions may remain as to what constitutes a new "legal issue" in the
context of summary judgment. See, e.g., Hastings v. Seegars Fence Co., 128 N.C. App.
166, 168-69, 493 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1997) (stating that the first judge's denial of defendant's
motion for summary judgment precluded a second judge from thereafter entering
summary judgment in favor of defendant, although the second judge considered
depositions which had not been before the first judge, where the legal issues raised by the
pleadings remained the same); Taylorsville Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Keen, 110 N.C.
App. 784, 785, 431 S.E.2d 484, 484 (1993) (stating that a motion for summary judgment
denied by one superior court judge may not be allowed by another superior court judge on
identical legal issues) (citations omitted); Vandervoort v. McKenzie, 105 N.C. App. 297,
302, 412 S.E.2d 696, 699 (1992) (stating that it was error for a judge to determine
defendant's second motion for summary judgment where another judge had denied a prior
motion for summary judgment on identical issues by the same defendant even though
materials presented to the court on the second motion were different from those at the
hearing on the first motion); Metts v. Piver, 102 N.C. App. 98, 101-02, 401 S.E.2d 407,
408-09 (1991) (holding that an additional forecast of evidence does not entitle a party to a
second chance at summary judgment on the same issues and rejecting defendants' claim
that their second summary judgment motion addressed new issues). But see Duvall, 304
N.C. at 562-63, 284 S.E.2d at 498-99 (holding that it was error to grant the State's renewed
motion for special jury venire from another county where new affidavits merely restated
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the parties and the court to reconsider the summary judgment motion
so as to avoid proceeding with a meaningless trial. This does indeed
appear to be the rule followed by the court of appeals, although the
case law reveals several caveats to the rule.
Some cases have held that the rule only applies if the second
motion is identical to the first. Thus, if the first judge denied a
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, then the second judge is prevented only
from rehearing another 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Several court of
appeals cases appear to apply this objective test 45 For instance, in
Barbour v. Little,246 the court of appeals stated, "[t]here is no merit in
plaintiffs' contention that, because Judge Lee denied defendants'
motion made under Rule 12 (b)(6) to dismiss the complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted on the
grounds that there is no genuine controversy in existence, Judge
Smith could not thereafter allow defendants' motion for summary
judgment made on the same grounds. While one superior court judge
identical information given at the hearing on original motion); State v. Langdon, 94 N.C.
App. 354, 356-57, 380 S.E.2d 388, 390 (1989) (noting that a second judge had authority to
consider a second motion to suppress because the "defendant's second motion contained
an additional allegation for suppression"); Furr v. Carmichael, 82 N.C. App. 634, 636-37,
347 S.E.2d 481, 483-84 (1986) (holding that issues in question are identical, and that
reconsideration is therefore not allowed, where "no new affidavit or evidence based on
discovery was filed or presented by either party at the hearing on defendants' motion for
summary judgment that was not before the trial court at the hearing on plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment"); Asheville Contracting Co. v. City of Wilson, 62 N.C. App. 329,
331, 303 S.E.2d 365, 367 (1983) (stating that where one judge ruled on defendants'
summary judgment motion only as to plaintiffs' contract claim and specifically declined to
rule on plaintiffs' tort claim, it was proper for a second judge thereafter to rule on
defendants' motion for summary judgment as to the tort claim).
245. See Whittaker Gen. Med. Corp. v. Daniel, 87 N.C. App. 659, 664, 362 S.E.2d 302,
305 (1987) (stating that the denial of a motion for summary judgment, based upon only a
forecast of evidence, should not operate to bar the granting of a directed verdict or a
judgment notwithstanding the verdict based on the evidence actually presented at trial),
rev'd in part on other grounds, 324 N.C. 523, 381 S.E.2d 792 (1989); Alltop v. J.C. Penney
Co., 10 N.C. App. 692, 694, 179 S.E.2d 885, 887 (1971) (stating that one judge's denial of a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim does not prevent a second judge from
granting a motion for summary judgment because the tests for each motion are different);
see also Pleasant Valley Promenade v. Lechmere, Inc., 120 N.C. App. 650, 660-61, 464
S.E.2d 47, 56 (1995) (noting that the second judge's ruling that a party breached an
agreement was more analogous to directing a verdict on the question of Lechmere's
liability than to reconsidering the first judge's denial of summary judgment on the issue of
breach). There is another variation of the objective test. See Tompkins v. Log Sys., Inc.,
96 N.C. App. 333, 335, 385 S.E.2d 545, 546-47 (1989) (stating that the second judge was
not foreclosed from considering the defendant's renewed motion for summary judgment
where the plaintiff had taken a voluntary dismissal without prejudice and refiled his claim
in a timely manner, because once refiled the case must be considered on its merits without
reference to the disposition of the prior action).
246. 37 N.C. App. 686,247 S.E.2d 252 (1978).
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may not overrule another, the two motions do not present the same
question.
'247
Other cases have, however, focused on the legal conclusions that
formed the basis for a decision so that an order resolving a
subsequent but different motion may not be based on a conflicting
legal conclusion, and a judge may be constrained by the legal analysis
underlying the previously entered interlocutory order. These cases
look beyond a motion's label to the underlying legal conclusions. 48
For example, in Estrada v. Jaques,249 the first judge granted the
plaintiff's motion to file an amended complaint and stated in his order
"only that the amendment related back" to the date the motion was
heard5 0 The order did not reserve judgment as to the statute of
limitations question? 1' The second judge later considered and
granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on a statute of
limitations defense. Estrada held that the second judge's granting of
summary judgment "effectively overruled" the first judge's
discretionary grant of plaintiff's motion to amend 5 2 The court
stated:
247. Id. at 692, 247 S.E.2d at 255 (emphasis added).
248. See Thornburg v. Lancaster, 303 N.C. 89, 96,277 S.E.2d 423, 428 (1981), overruled
on other grounds by 320 N.C. 669, 360 S.E.2d 277 (1987) (stating that for the second judge
"to refuse to grant the Rule 41(b) motion on the ground that he disagreed with the earlier
[objectively different] order of a fellow superior court judge would ... have been
erroneous"); Madry v. Madry, 106 N.C. App. 34, 37-38, 415 S.E.2d 74, 77 (1992) (stating
that where the issue of the applicability of North Carolina General Statutes section 50-5.1
was the same, as were materials and arguments, labeling of the second order as summary
judgment did not change its essential character nor authorize the second judge to overrule
the denial of the motion to dismiss by the first judge); Iverson v. TM One, Inc, 92 N.C.
App. 161, 165,374 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1988) ("While the defendant did not label its motion to
[the second judge] as one for summary judgment, that nonetheless was the essence of the
request .... Therefore, [the second judge's] judgment dismissing the complaint had the
effect of overruling [the first judge's] denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment
and must be vacated."); Pittman v. Pittman, 73 N.C. App. 584, 588-89, 327 S.E.2d 8, 11
(1985) (stating that where the first judge denied a motion to dismiss, stating inexplicably
that plaintiff "has not been guilty of laches," the second judge could not grant a
subsequent motion for summary judgment on the apparent basis of laches because the
second judge was "without authority to overrule, either expressly or implicitly, [the] prior
determination") (emphasis added). But see Urbano v. Days Inn of America, Inc., 58 N.C.
App. 795, 799, 295 S.E.2d 240, 242-43 (1982) (noting that where the first judge denied
franchisor's motion for summary judgment, it is not error for a second judge to grant
operator's motion for summary judgment, regardless of apparent logical inconsistency and
identity of the legal issue, as "each defendant was entitled to have its motion considered
and ruled upon separately").
249. 70 N.C. App. 627,321 S.E.2d 240 (1984).





We presume that the court did not allow the amendment as
a mere pointless gesture. We will not presume that having
heard argument and allowed the amendment, [the first
judge] then expected Estrada to affirmatively seek a ruling
that the amendment thus allowed related back. The law
does not require performance of vain acts .... By allowing
[defendants'] motion for summary judgment on the statute
of limitations defense ... [the second judge] effectively
overruled [the first judge's] prior determination; by ruling
that the amendment did not relate back, he effectively
denied [plaintiff's] already granted motion. This he lacked
authority to do. Calloway v. Ford Motor Co.21
3
This subjective analysis of previously entered interlocutory
orders may be burdensome and subject to varying interpretations. A
judge considering his authority to rule on a motion must first
determine whether any identical motions have been filed in the case
(the objective test), but then he must also consider and review non-
identical motions and the orders entered for each in order to
determine, if possible, the legal basis and whether or not there is a
conflict with the legal basis which in his opinion would resolve the
motion before him. Again, if this review is not performed (even if not
requested by the parties) an appellate court may later determine that
the judge lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion z54
253. Id. at 636-37,321 S.E.2d at 246-47.
254. In State v. Smith, 117 N.C. App. 671, 452 S.E.2d 827 (1995), objectively identical
motions were held to raise different legal issues. See id. at 675, 452 S.E.2d at 829. Two
defendants, Smith and Campbell, traveling together, were stopped by police officers and a
packet of drugs was seized from each defendant. At Smith's trial on trafficking charges,
the first judge suppressed the packet of drugs seized from Smith on the grounds that the
initial stop was unconstitutional. Smith was then indicted for conspiracy based on the
same transaction. He sought to suppress the packet of drugs seized from Campbell
arguing that the second judge was bound by the first judge's holding that the stop was
unconstitutional. The court upheld the second judge's order denying the motion to
suppress on the grounds that the second judge "was asked to rule on an entirely new and
different matter." Id. In Sims v. Ritter Constr., Inc., 62 N.C. App. 52, 302 S.E.2d 293
(1983), plaintiffs sought to recover damages for breach of a building contract. Defendant
moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the contract between the parties
provided for arbitration of any disagreement arising out of the contract. The first judge
agreed with defendant and ordered that all matters in controversy be submitted to
arbitration. Seven months later the matter again came on for hearing before another
judge who held that because "neither party having taken any action whatsoever to initiate
arbitration proceedings, and [the first judge's] Order not specifying which party shall pay
the expense or initiate such action, the Court therefore concludes that the matter should
be placed on the trial calendar for disposition." Id. at 52-53, 302 S.E.2d at 294. Despite
the fact that the second judge was clearly not overruling the legal analysis of the first
judge-but rather the second judge was determining that subsequent events justified some
sort of waiver of the contractual right to arbitration-the court held that the second
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Case law has also created an exception that allows the second
judge to overrule the first judge on a question of law if the question of
law concerns the first judge's jurisdiction to have ruled on the initial
matter. In McAllister v. Cone Mills Corp.,55 the first judge denied
defendant's Rule 12(b)(6) motion that was based on the ground that
plaintiff's action was barred by the Workers' Compensation Act 5 6
Subsequently, the defendant made a motion for summary judgment
based on the same jurisdictional grounds as the 12(b)(6) motion that
had been previously denied. The court of appeals held that the trial
court did not err in granting summary judgment for defendant on the
same issue previously ruled upon by the first judge.257 The court
stated that a court must dismiss a case "if it finds at any stage of the
proceedings that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction," apparently even
if such determination overrules the contrary legal conclusion of the
first judge.28
The court of appeals has also found other legal principles that
permit avoidance of the rule's harsh consequences. In Graham v.
Mid-State Oil Co., 9 plaintiff sued for conversion and unfair trade
practices. Defendant's motion for summary judgment was granted as
to the conversion claim but denied as to the unfair trade practice. At
pretrial conference defendant asked a second judge to dismiss the
unfair trade practice claim on the grounds that the first judge's
granting of summary judgment as to the conversion claim implicitly
precluded proceeding on the unfair trade practice claim. Failure to
dismiss the claim would result in the parties proceeding to trial on the
unfair trade practice issue when the basis for the claim, the
conversion, had already been found not to exist. Dismissing the
claim, however, would require the second judge to, in essence, grant
the motion for summary judgment that the first judge had previously
denied. The second judge dismissed the claim. Plaintiff appealed,
arguing that the second judge had improperly overruled the first
judge. The court of appeals affirmed the second judge, but did not
apply the overrule analysis.2 Instead, the court stated: "To hold
otherwise would result in an inconsistent judgment. Inconsistent
judge's order was void because it overruled the first judge's order. See id. at 55, 302 S.E.2d
at 295.
255. 88 N.C. App. 577,364 S.E.2d 186 (1988).
256. See id. at 579,364 S.E.2d at 187.
257. See id. at 579-582,364 S.E.2d at 188-89.
258. Id. at 579,364 S.E.2d at 188.
259. 79 N.C. App. 716,340 S.E.2d 521 (1986).




If there is manifest error in a legal ruling that will serve as the
basis for further litigation (and thus be subject to reversal on appeal),
the trial court might consider correcting the error despite the
argument that he or she has no jurisdiction to overrule the first
judge's erroneous order. On appeal, the reviewing judges may find a
way to uphold such an order that is legally correct and efficient, but
nonetheless erroneous.262 In Smithwick v. Crutchfield,263 the plaintiff
sued for damages sustained in a motor vehicle accident. Defendant
counterclaimed, and the plaintiff replied by alleging that the
defendant had signed a complete release that barred all claims. One
judge dismissed defendant's counterclaim, and another judge denied
defendant's motion for summary judgment, which was based upon the
rule that a plaintiff may not sue for injuries sustained in an
automobile accident, while at the same time relying upon a complete
release given by the defendant to defeat the defendant's counterclaim
for damages arising out of the same accident. Before a third judge,
the defendant and the plaintiff offered as evidence the entire file in
the lawsuit, and after considering the evidence and arguments of
counsel, the court made findings of fact and entered judgment for
defendant, concluding that plaintiff's claims were barred as a matter
of law by the pleading of the release. Plaintiff appealed. The court of
appeals held that although "rendered at a different stage of the
proceeding," the legal issue resolved by the third judge was "precisely
the same question of law" as previously decided by the second
judge.264 Thus, it was a rehearing of defendant's motion for summary
judgment and violated the "principle that one Superior Court judge
may not overrule another," and so was error even though legally
correct.20 In this case, however, the defendant had excepted to and
appealed the second judge's denial of summary judgment so the court
of appeals held that denial to be error and plaintiff's claim barred as a
matter of law.26 If the third judge had not ruled as he did, the parties
would have proceeded with a pointless trial. Even if the legitimacy of
the second judge's ruling had not been properly appealed, the
appellate court may still have chosen to uphold the third judge's
261. Id.
262. See Greene v. Charlotte Chem. Lab., Inc., 254 N.C. 680, 694, 120 S.E.2d 82, 91
(1961) ("The ruling of Judge Hooks was legally correct, but erroneous nevertheless.").
263. 87 N.C. App. 374,361 S.E.2d 111 (1987).
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erroneous (but legally correct) ruling by exercising its supervisory
jurisdiction over the lower courts to avoid unnecessary delay in the
administration of justice.267
Finally, it is also clear that the appellate courts will sometimes
simply fail to recognize or acknowledge the effect of the rule. In
Shiloh Methodist Church v. Keever Heating & Cooling,26 the majority
stated that the dispositive issue on appeal was "whether a successful
service of process occurring within thirty days after issuance of a
summons is valid (in the absence of an endorsement, allas summons
or pluries summons) if there has been a prior unsuccessful attempt at
serving that same summons. 269 The opinion resolved this issue, but
then noted in a footnote that the plaintiff had asserted "an alternative
argument" that "[the second judge] was without authority to grant
summary judgment for the defendant on the same grounds that [the
first judge] denied the defendant's motion to dismiss. We agree ...
[the second judge] effectively overruled [the first judge] and he did
not have jurisdiction to do so.' '27° This footnote thus agreed with
Judge John's concurrence in the result that "[i]t is well established
that one superior court judge may not overrule another."271
Therefore, it would appear that the dispositive issue in this case was
the lack of authority to overrule and that Judge Greene's majority
opinion is dicta.
In another case, Dunkley v. Shoemate,272 a law firm moved for
permission from the court to appear as counsel for an absent
defendant on a limited basis in order to protect the interests of the
defendant's insurance company and to respond to discovery requests
to the extent that it could provide reliable responses without having
communicated with the defendant.2 73 The first judge granted this
motion. Plaintiff filed a motion to remove the law firm as counsel for
defendant on the basis that the attorneys at the law firm had never
spoken to defendant and defendant had never authorized the law firm
to represent him, which facts had been admitted by the parties at the
hearing on the first motion. The second judge denied this motion on
the express basis that he had no authority to overrule the first judge's
267. See Greene, 254 N.C. at 694, 120 S.E.2d at 91.
268. 127 N.C. App. 619,492 S.E.2d 380 (1997).
269. Id. at 621,492 S.E.2d at 381.
270. Id. at 622-23 n.1, 492 S.E.2d at 382 n.1 (citing Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281
N.C. 496,189 S.E.2d 484 (1972)).
271. Id. at 622,492 S.E.2d at 382 (citing Calloway, 281 N.C. at 501, 189 S.E.2d at 488).
272. 350 N.C. 573,515 S.E.2d 442 (1999).
273. See id. at 576,515 S.E.2d at 444.
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order allowing such representation2 4 The plaintiff did not appeal the
first judge's order, but did appeal the second judge's order.27 Both
the court of appeals and subsequently the supreme court held that the
second judge's order was erroneous because "a law firm or attorney
may not represent a client without the client's permission to do so. "276
Neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court addressed the fact
that the second judge did not rule on the substance of the plaintiff's
motion but instead ruled that he had no authority to reconsider the
motion in light of the first judge's ruling. Both courts simply ignored
the rule and reached the substantive legal issue.
2 77
C. The Rule of the Court of Appeals in Practice: The Consequences
of a Dysfunctional Rule
Since Calloway, appellate courts have avoided defining the test
of what constitutes sufficiently changed circumstances to permit
reconsideration. One result of this reluctance to articulate the test
has been the de facto adoption by many lawyers and judges of an
over-simplified rule of thumb as the test governing reconsideration-
that is, the unfortunate aphorism that one judge may not overrule
another. Practicing attorneys, trial judges, and even appellate judges
often fall back on the overstated and imprecise version of the rule as
recently stated in Able Outdoor, Inc. v. Harrelson78 This simplified
version of the Calloway rule clearly violates the majority rule, but it
even violates the rule as applied in Calloway2 79 and its progeny. If it is
274. See Dunkley v. Shoemate, 129 N.C. App. 255, 257, 497 S.E.2d 713, 714 (1998)
("Judge Battle considered himself bound by Judge Stanback's prior order allowing the
representation and denied plaintiff's motion."), rev'd on other grounds, 346 N.C. 274, 485
S.E.2d 295 (1997).
275. See Dunkley v. Shoemate, 346 N.C. 274, 274, 485 S.E.2d 295, 295 (1997) (stating
that an interlocutory order denying a motion to remove affected a substantial right and so
was immediately appealable) (per curiam).
276. Dunldey v. Shoemate, 350 N.C. 573,578,515 S.E.2d 442,445 (1999).
277. Despite acknowledging that no appeal was taken from the first judge's order
allowing the representation, the supreme court nevertheless overruled the order
substantively because there was "no basis for allowing the motion to appear." Id. at 576,
515 S.E.2d at 444. But see State v. Sams, 317 N.C. 230, 234-35, 345 S.E.2d 179, 182-83
(1986) (holding that the appellate court could not review the first judge's ruling because
the matter had not been properly appealed); Smithwick v. Crutchfield, 87 N.C. App. 374,
377, 361 S.E.2d 111, 113 (1987) (stating that the appellate court could review the first
judge's ruling because the matter had been properly appealed).
278. 341 N.C. 167, 169, 459 S.E.2d 626, 627 (1995) ("One superior court judge may not
overrule another."); see also Shiloh Methodist Church v. Keever Heating & Cooling, 127
N.C. App. 619, 622, 492 S.E.2d 380, 382 (1997) (John, J., concurring) (stating that "[iut is
well established that one superior court judge may not overrule another").
279. Even Calloway includes the modifier "ordinarily" in its statement of the rule:
"[O]rdinarily one judge may not modify, overrule, or change the judgment of another
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important for a trial court to manage and supervise the litigation
pending before it, then a general belief of the bench and bar that
judges have no authority to overrule other judges' earlier
intermediate decisions may cause litigation to be undermanaged and
undersupervised. For instance, even under the court of appeals's
current rule (and clearly under the majority rule) a judge should
consider a party's argument that the judge should reconsider a
previously entered interlocutory order. After all, there may have
been a sufficient change of circumstance to allow reconsideration of a
discretionary order, or there may be new issues of law, jurisdiction, or
other matters relating to the earlier order that resolved a legal
question that would allow what might initially appear to be
reconsideration. Yet application of the simple rule as stated in Able
Outdoor can result in the court's refusal to hear and consider the
grounds for reconsideration. 80 Anecdotal evidence suggests that the
Able Outdoor statement is widely accepted as a complete statement
of the rule and is sometimes applied to deny summarily a motion to
reconsider.
The court of appeals's absolute prohibition of reconsideration of
questions of law coupled with the appellate courts' inconsistency 1 in
Superior Court judge previously made in the same action." Calloway v. Ford Motor Co.,
281 N.C. 496,501,189 S.E.2d 484,488 (1972).
280. Expressly allowing attorneys to seek reconsideration of interlocutory orders is not
expected to result in a flood of such motions. As one commentator has noted from a
jurisdiction that allows such motions:
[1]n practice, lawyers do not misuse motions for reconsideration. Such motions
are not filed as a matter of course and are usually only filed where the lawyer
feels strongly that the judge has ruled erroneously. The reluctance of most trial
lawyers to file motions to reconsider, except in those cases where they especially
feel the trial judge has ruled incorrectly, accounts for the statement found in
appellate decisions that while trial judges should not "use lightly" their power to
modify another judge's nonfinal ruling, with respect to law of the case "courts
must not afford this procedural doctrine undue emphasis."
Hon. Robert L. Gottsfield, Law of the Case vs. Horizontal Appeals: Reconsideration of
Issues by Successive Trial Judges, 31 ARIZ. ATr'y 23, 24 (1995) (citations omitted).
281. The appellate courts sometimes appear simply to ignore the rule and to address
the substantive issue that is not properly before the court if the rule applies. Appellate
opinions also undermine the impact of the rule when the underlying substantive issue is
addressed and the rule against reconsideration is then mentioned as an alternative basis
for the result. If the rule applies to deny the second judge's authority to reconsider, then
the substantive issue is not before the appellate court. See Shiloh, 127 N.C. App. at 622,
492 S.E.2d at 382 (addressing and resolving the substantive issue on appeal despite
agreeing in a footnote with the concurring opinion that the trial judge who entered the
order had no authority to enter the order because a previous judge had already ruled on
the matter); Sheppard v. Community Fed. Say. & Loan, 84 N.C. App. 257,261, 352 S.E.2d
252, 255 (1987) (stating within the context of finding substantive fault with the ruling of
the successor judge that "he also in effect overruled another Superior Court judge, which
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applying the harsh rule in certain cases may also encourage trial
judges to consider a return to the majority rule, that reconsideration
is proper "where there are good reasons to do so" or "when justice
requires." When there is manifest error and adherence to the rule
would clearly require further litigation grounded on such error, trial
judges may decide that a proper case exists to reconsider and correct
the manifestly erroneous legal ruling on the assumption that the
appellate courts will find a way to uphold such manifestly appropriate
orders.
CONCLUSION: RETURN TO THE PRE-CALLOWAYMAJORTY RULE
The stated holding in Calloway-that changed conditions are
required in order to allow reconsideration of discretionary denials of
motions to amend-is historically unsupported and overly stringent.
By not recognizing the unusual nature of the orders on motions to
amend in the case before it and in the cases that it cited, the court in
effect held purely discretionary orders on motions to amend subject
to the doctrine of imputed law of the case, forcing trial judges to
weigh changed conditions in situations that traditionally could be
reconsidered in any proper case. The rationale in Calloway has
misled lower courts into extending this requirement to all
discretionary orders and into denying the power to reconsider matters
of law altogether. Furthermore, if new facts were necessary for
consideration of a renewed motion to amend, as claimed by Calloway,
there were arguably no new facts before Judge Ervin sufficient to
support a reconsideration in this case, and therefore the decision in
Calloway may be wrong even on its own terms.
If, however, the holding in Calloway is viewed more broadly and
is interpreted to have overruled or modified the majority rule, then it
is still arguable that the Calloway rationale does not compel the rule
that the court of appeals has formulated. Even if Calloway revised
the rule to require a change of condition instead of a proper case in
order to reconsider interlocutory orders, Calloway did not mandate
that issues of law be treated differently from discretionary matters.
Even under a revised rule there may be changes of condition that
would justify reconsideration of an interlocutory order involving a
question of law. Also, the court of appeals's rule is unclear as to the
standard required to demonstrate the material change of
circumstance that will justify reconsideration of a discretionary
interlocutory order. This lack of clarity certainly originated with
our law does not approve").
2000] 1865
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Calloway itself and its insistence on calling a judge's rulings on
matters of law (Judge Ervin's denial of plaintiff's motion to strike
Ford's amended answer and Judge Ervin's grant of Ford's motion for
summary judgment) a "material change in conditions" and the
"intervention of new facts." Nevertheless, even if Calloway is read
to have revised the rule, the supreme court should clarify what the
standard should be for determining whether a change of circumstance
has occurred that will support reconsideration.3
The Supreme Court of North Carolina should consider a return
to the majority rule governing reconsideration of interlocutory
orders. Balancing the pros and cons of reconsideration, the majority
rule is both better policy and the better rule for properly managing
ongoing litigation. The majority rule was never explicitly rejected by
the North Carolina Supreme Court, and Calloway does not provide
adequate analysis to support any change in the law or an adequate
foundation for a new rule. The efforts by the court of appeals to
282. Calloway, 281 N.C. at 505, 189 S.E.2d at 490.
283. For instance, why were the undisputed new facts and changed conditions present
in Atkinson v. Atkinson, 132 N.C. App. 82, 510 S.E.2d 181 (1999), rev'd on other grounds,
350 N.C. 590, 516 S.E.2d 381 (1999), nevertheless found to be insufficient to justify the
trial judge's reconsideration? See supra notes 235-39 and accompanying text (explaining
the facts and rationale of the court of appeals decision in Atkinson). Should they have
been sufficient in comparison with the equities in Calloway? Also, in Urbano v. Days Inn
of America, Inc., 58 N.C. App. 795, 295 S.E.2d 240 (1982), a case similar to Calloway,
plaintiff sued both the operator-franchisee and the non-operating-franchisor of a motel for
negligence. See id. at 796-97, 295 S.E.2d at 241. One judge allowed the summary
judgment motion of the operator-franchisee while a successor judge denied the summary
judgment motion of the non-operating-franchisor-a result that seems comparable to the
situation in Calloway. See id. at 797, 295 S.E.2d 241. The issue was not raised in Urbano,
but if the denial of the non-operating-franchisor's summary judgment motion occurred
prior to the grant of the operator-franchisee's motion would Calloway have supported a
reconsideration of the non-operating-franchisor's summary judgment motion based on the
grant of the operator-franchisee's motion?
284. Although it is the duty of the supreme court to adhere to its decisions, see Hill v.
Railroad, 143 N.C. 539, 573, 55 S.E. 854, 868-69 (1906), the precedential authority of a
case is "'proportionately weakened' "when the point at issue" 'was not taken or inquired
into at all [and] there is no ground for presuming that it was duly considered,'" Paterson
v. McCormick, 177 N.C. 448,456-57, 99 S.E. 401, 405 (1919) (quoting 15 C.J. § 333 (1918)).
Furthermore,
"It is no doubt true that even a single adjudication of this Court, upon a question
properly before it, is not to be questioned or disregarded, except for the most
cogent reasons, and then only in a case where it is plain that the judgment was
the result of a mistaken view of the condition of the law applicable to the
question .... [The doctrine of stare decisis] does not apply to a case where it can
be shown that the law has been misunderstood or misapplied, or where the
former determination is contrary to reason. The authorities are abundant to
show that in such cases it is the duty of the courts to re-examine the question."
Mial v. Ellington, 134 N.C. 131, 158, 46 S.E. 961, 970 (1903) (quoting Rumsey v. New
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define and extend the new rule purportedly set out in Calloway have
resulted in a rule that is not sufficiently predictable nor
understandable. The supreme court should reconsider this area of
the law and clarify, disavow, or overrule Calloway.
If North Carolina courts return to the majority rule that
interlocutory orders not immediately reviewable may be reconsidered
in a proper case, the appellate courts will need to define any
limitations on the trial court's determination that a case is "proper."
The trial court should generally allow counsel to be heard as to why a
case is proper for reconsideration, and summary denial might be an
abuse of discretion. If the trial court determines that the matter is
proper for reconsideration, then the court should hear the matter and
rule on the substantive issue raised. If, on the other hand, the court
concludes the case is not a proper one for reconsideration, the court
should be able to deny the motion to reconsider without considering
the substance of the renewal. If the movant establishes a change of
condition sufficient to render the previous ruling no longer
applicable, then the substantive issue should be heard de novo and
not as a matter of reconsideration. In such case, the trial court might
abuse its discretion if it refused to provide the de novo hearing and to
rule on the substantive issue raised. The trial court might also
commit error in its initial determination as to whether the change of
circumstances was sufficient to require a de novo consideration.
Reconsideration should never be routinely granted, and allowing
reconsideration should not guarantee a modification or overruling of
the previously entered order. Judges should hesitate before finding
that a matter presents a proper case for reconsideration, but such a
decision must rest largely in the discretion of the trial court. No
factor will always be determinative in deciding whether or not
reconsideration will be granted, but important factors that should be
weighed include: (a) what stage the proceeding is in when the request
for reconsideration is made because as trial or final disposition
approaches, stability takes on increased importance; (b) whether a
successor judge is reconsidering his own or a predecessor judge's
prior ruling; (c) what level of doubt is involved regarding the
appropriateness of the prior ruling; (d) what type of issue is involved
and whether any prejudice would result in overruling the prior ruling;
York, 30 N.E. 654 (N.Y. 1892)). But see McGowan v. Davenport, 134 N.C. 526, 531-32, 47
S.E. 27, 29 (1904) ("We have never regarded a decision by per curiam order as a binding
precedent ... [I]t should not have the effect of overruling a previous decision based on a
well-considered opinion, and especially when the latter was not commented on or even
cited by the Court.").
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(e) whether there has been any change in the applicable law; (f)
whether the moving party is offering new evidence; (g) whether the
issue involved in the first ruling was inadequately briefed; and (h)
whether manifest injustice would result unless the court reconsiders
the prior ruling.8 It should also be noted that acquiescence or
imputed law of the case might be more appropriately considered as a
powerful factor favoring a refusal to reconsider rather than a rule that
prohibits reconsideration in all cases. 6
Should North Carolina return to the majority rule, much will
remain to be resolved. North Carolina courts will have to grapple
with such difficult questions as the proper limits of a judge's
discretion to reconsider and the sufficiency of changed conditions to
distinguish a renewal from an earlier motion. These difficulties,
however, are no greater than those under current law. The
determination of the sufficiency of changed conditions, for instance, is
as difficult a question under current law as it would be under the
majority rule. And the question of whether a judge may properly
reconsider an order seems less subject to abuse or confusion than
does the determination under current law of whether the strict
jurisdictional prohibition against reconsideration applies. Whether a
case is proper for reconsideration is a question best left to the able
trial judge's discretion. Such a rule that trusts the trial judge's
exercise of discretion is not unusual, nor is it a high price to pay to
ensure the trial court's ability to administer the trial process
effectively and to maintain its integrity. North Carolina's return to
the majority rule would properly recognize the trial judges' inherent
power to modify, overrule, change, and correct orders in fieri-a
power that the trial court formerly enjoyed and a power necessary to
the proper functioning of our judicial system.
285. See Trembly v. Mrs. Fields Cookies, 884 P.2d 1306, 1311 (Utah 1994) (stating that,
in determining the propriety of reconsidering a prior ruling, the court can consider several
factors, including when: (1) the matter is presented in a "different light;" (2) there has
been a change in the governing law; (3) a party offers new evidence; (4) "manifest
injustice" will result if the court does not reconsider its prior ruling; (5) a court needs to
correct its own errors; or (6) an issue was inadequately briefed when first contemplated by
the court).
286. One noted commentator takes the strong position that "[t]he fact that appeal
might have been taken from various intermediate orders under an interlocutory appeal
statute or an expanded version of the final judgment rule should not preclude
reconsideration by the trial court .... ." WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 5, § 4433, at 307;
see also United States v. United States Smelting Ref. & Mining Co., 339 U.S. 186, 198-99
(1950) (stating that the election to forego a permissive interlocutory appeal does not
transform a nonfinal decision into law of the case).
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